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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have written volumes about the dramatic constitutional changes that oc-
curred in the United States in the decades after World War II. Several leading scholarly
accounts adopt an internal perspective, focusing primarily on domestic factors that
drove constitutional change.1 Other scholars adopt a more transnational perspective,
linking domestic constitutional change in the United States to Cold War politics,2 or
to the rise of totalitarianism.3 This Article builds on the work of scholars like Mary
Dudziak and Richard Primus who have emphasized the transnational factors that con-
tributed to constitutional change in the United States. However, our account differs
from both Dudziak and Primus because we emphasize that constitutional change in the
United States from 1948 to 1976 should be understood in the context of the global
human rights revolution that occurred during the same time frame.4
This Article marries international human rights and comparative constitutional
scholarship with scholarship about constitutional change in the United States. It sug-
gests that American constitutional scholars can gain a richer understanding of the
dynamics of constitutional change by drawing on insights from international and com-
parative research. Conventional wisdom depicts the United States as insulated from
transnational forces that led to the global diffusion of human rights norms. We contend
* John A. & Elizabeth H. Sutro Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. 
** John A. McCone Chair in International Relations, Professor of International Relations
and Law, University of Southern California. The authors thank participants in the following
workshops and conferences for valuable feedback: the Loyola Constitutional Law Colloquium
at Loyola University of Chicago; a faculty workshop at the University of Arizona School of
Law; the American Society of International Law Research Forum at UCLA Law School; the
International Law in Domestic Courts workshop at University of Pennsylvania; and the Na-
tional Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars hosted by the Rehnquist Center at University
of Arizona.
1 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REV-
OLUTION 26–27 (2014).
2 See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 113 (2000).
3 See RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 71 (1999).
4 In this respect, our thesis has much in common with Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration:
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115
YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
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that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, this Article suggests that three
distinct phenomena are closely related: the creation of modern international human
rights law (the “internationalization” of human rights); the incorporation of human
rights norms into national constitutions in numerous countries (the “constitutional-
ization” of human rights); and the transfer of regulatory authority over human rights
from the states to the federal government in the United States (the “federalization”
of human rights).
The underlying theory is simple: The power of ideas is an important factor that
contributes to legal change, and ideas do not respect national boundaries. The period
from 1948 to 1976 witnessed a global diffusion of an identifiable set of ideas,5 which
we call the “political morality of human rights.”6 The global diffusion of the political
morality of human rights was an important causal factor that contributed to the inter-
nationalization of human rights, the constitutionalization of human rights, and the
federalization of human rights in the United States. The leading scholarly accounts
of the civil rights revolution in the United States offer many important insights about
the dynamics of constitutional change. However, they are incomplete insofar as they
fail to account for the global diffusion of human rights norms as an important factor
contributing to constitutional change in the United States. To be clear, we do not claim
that international human rights law—as law—caused constitutional changes in the
United States. Instead, we contend that the diffusion of human rights norms as a global
political morality was an important causal factor that contributed to the federaliza-
tion of human rights in the United States. Moreover, the process of federalization
significantly strengthened domestic legal protection for fundamental rights in the
United States.
The political morality of human rights existed before World War II. However, rev-
elations about Nazi concentration camps gave tremendous impetus to the diffusion
of human rights as a global political morality.7 The internationalization of human rights
5 On the concept of diffusion, see KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS
OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW HEALTH, FAMILY, AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS
COUNTRIES 34 (2013).
6 We borrow the term from Professor Perry. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL
POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 2 (2017).
Professor Perry defines “political morality” as a set of norms about how governments should
act toward human beings, “a set of norms, in particular, about what government should not
do to and what it should do for the human beings over whom it exercises power.” Id. at 26
(emphasis added). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)—the foundational
document of international human rights law—makes clear that the core principles of the
political morality of human rights include equality, universality, and inalienability. See G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]
(declaring “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”). Hence,
we define the political morality of human rights as the moral proposition that governments
have a duty to respect and protect, in a non-discriminatory manner, the inalienable rights of
all human beings who are subject to the exercise of governmental power.
7 PERRY, supra note 6, at 5.
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law between 1948 and 1976 is well known; it provides the most obvious evidence that
human rights was then emerging as a global political morality.8 This Article docu-
ments the constitutionalization of human rights and the federalization of human rights
in the United States during the same time frame.
The political morality of human rights has deep roots in American political cul-
ture. The Declaration of Independence proclaims “that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”9 Nevertheless,
for most of American history, responsibility for protection of those unalienable rights
was vested primarily in state governments, not the federal government. In the early
1950s, the American Bar Association was implacably hostile to international human
rights law. Frank Holman, who was ABA President from 1948 to 1949, sounded the
alarm about the dangers of ratifying human rights treaties.10 Treaty ratification, he
warned, would “result in changing our form of government from a republic to a social-
istic and centralized state—with such increase in the power of the Federal Government
at the expense of the states that the doctrine of states’ rights and local self-government
can become . . . nonexistent in the United States.”11 Holman’s warning was partially
prophetic. Between 1948 and 1976, the federal government seized power over human
rights law from the states.12 However, treaty ratification was not the mechanism that
transferred power from the states to the federal government, as Holman had feared.
Instead, the federal government appropriated power over human rights by silently
incorporating human rights norms into federal constitutional and statutory law.
This Article identifies 68 discrete rights that are included in both the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)13 and the Comparative Constitutions Project
database.14 As of 1948, state governments exercised primary or exclusive regulatory
authority for 71% of those rights (48 of 68), whereas the federal government exercised
primary or exclusive regulatory authority for only 29% (20 of 68).15 By 1976, the al-
location of authority between state and federal governments had flipped. As of 1976,
the federal government exercised primary or exclusive regulatory authority for 74% of
those rights (50 of 68), and state governments exercised primary or exclusive regulatory
8 Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 405 (1979).
9 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
10 Frank E. Holman, Treaty Law-Making: A Blank Check for Writing a New Constitution,
36 A.B.A. J. 707, 789 (1950).
11 Id. at 788.
12 Makau Wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for De-
marginalizing Enforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 215–16 (1998).
13 UDHR, supra note 6.
14 Zachary Elkins et al., Characteristics of National Constitutions, Version 2.0, COM-
PARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT (2014), http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/down
load-data [https://perma.cc/FPX3-HHJE]. All sixty-eight rights are listed in the Appendix.
Part I explains how we derived that set of sixty-eight rights.
15 See infra Part III.
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authority for only 26% (18 of 68).16 Four decades later, in 2018, the division of power
over human rights between state and federal governments is virtually the same as it
was in 1976.17 Thus, the constitutional revolution in the United States in the decades
after World War II was not merely a rights revolution—it also entailed a radical change
in the division of regulatory authority between the states and the federal government.
Scholarly accounts that attempt to explain the radical change in constitutional federal-
ism as the natural development of the inner logic of American constitutionalism are
unpersuasive.18 The transfer of authority over human rights from the states to the fed-
eral government represented a sharp break from one of the core premises that guided
American constitutional development from the Founding until the 1930s: the assump-
tion that governmental responsibility for protection of fundamental rights was vested
primarily in the states, not the federal government.19
This Article demonstrates that the United States federalized human rights through
a process of silent incorporation.20 Silent incorporation occurred primarily through
three different mechanisms. First, the Supreme Court decided that rights specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights—which had previously constrained only the federal
government—would henceforth be binding on state governments also.21 Second, the
Supreme Court granted federal constitutional protection for “unenumerated rights”:
that is, rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution’s text.22 Third, Congress en-
acted federal statutes that, for much of U.S. history, would have been deemed uncon-
stitutional encroachments on areas reserved to state law.23 Nevertheless, courts upheld
those statutes as valid exercises of federal legislative power.
The federalization of human rights in the United States proceeded in parallel with
the internationalization of human rights law. Between 1948 and 1976, the United
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Section III.E.
18 Professor Akhil Amar argues, in effect, that the United States federalized human rights
law when it adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 6–7 (1998). We agree that ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment was an important milestone. However, Part III demonstrates that the
period from 1948 to 1976 was the key time period for federalization of human rights in the
United States.
19 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 243 (1833); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
36, 67–68 (1872). New Deal programs adopted in the 1930s initiated the process of federal-
ization of human rights in the United States. However, as documented in Part III, the most
significant federalization occurred after 1948.
20 See David L. Sloss & Michael P. Van Alstine, International Law in Domestic Courts,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79, 104–05 (Wayne
Sandholtz & Christopher A. Whytock eds., 2017) (discussing silent incorporation).
21 See AMAR, supra note 18, at 7.
22 See infra Section III.C.2.
23 See infra Section III.C.3.
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Nations adopted the UDHR, the Genocide Convention,24 the Convention on Racial
Discrimination (CERD),25 the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),26 and
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).27 During the same
period, Europe and Latin America developed regional human rights systems. Although
the international human rights regime has expanded dramatically since 1976, the core
principles of modern international human rights law were codified in human rights
treaties by 1976.
The internationalization and federalization of human rights are closely related
to a third phenomenon: the constitutionalization of human rights. Almost all modern
constitutions provide for individual rights and enumerate specific rights.28 In the
decades after World War II, more than ninety percent of new constitutions included
some form of rights guarantees.29 Since 1976, virtually all new constitutions have done
so.30 The “new constitutionalism” that emerged in Western Europe after World War II
included “a charter of fundamental rights” and “a mode of constitutional review to
protect those rights.”31 That model had “diffused globally” by the 1990s.32 According
to one analysis, “[o]f 106 national constitutions written since 1985, every one con-
tained a charter of rights.”33 In a comprehensive empirical analysis, Professors Law
and Versteeg found that, over the past sixty years, constitutions show a trend toward
“‘generic rights constitutionalism,’ wherein an increasing proportion of the world’s
constitutions possess an increasing number of rights in common.”34 As noted above,
this Article identifies 68 discrete rights that are included in both the UDHR and the
Comparative Constitutions Project database. As of 1947, the average national consti-
tution contained just 11.6 of those 68 rights; by 2005, the average national constitution
contained 30.7 of the 68 rights.35
24 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
25 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [here-
inafter CERD].
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
27 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan.3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
28 Philip Alston, Bills of Rights: An Analytical Framework, in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 2 (Philip Alston ed., 1999).
29 Id. at 3.
30 Id. at 2.
31 Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816, 816 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 816 n.2.
34 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2011).
35 See infra Section II.A.
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Somewhat paradoxically, the United States was both a leader and a laggard in
incorporating global human rights norms into domestic law. The United States was
a leader because the process of federalization in the United States was essentially
complete by 1976. In contrast, aside from Western democracies, most of which devel-
oped robust constitutional protection for human rights by the 1970s, the process of
incorporating human rights norms into national constitutions did not gain significant
momentum in most other countries until after 1980. However, the United States was
also a laggard in the sense that it has declined to participate fully in human rights trea-
ties. The United States waited almost forty years to ratify the Genocide Convention.
The United States was also slow to ratify the CERD and the ICCPR. It has still not rat-
ified the ICESCR, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), or the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
When the United States does ratify human rights treaties, it routinely limits domestic
judicial enforcement of the treaties by stipulating that they are not self-executing.36
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains how we de-
rived the set of sixty-eight rights that form the basis for our analysis. Part II analyzes
data from the Comparative Constitutions Project database to examine constitution-
alization of human rights in other countries. Part III analyzes the federalization of
human rights in the United States. Part IV contends that the diffusion of human rights
as a global political morality was an important factor contributing to the federaliza-
tion of human rights in the United States.
Before proceeding further, one cautionary note is in order. The judicial decisions
and legislative enactments that federalized human rights law in the United States
rarely mention international human rights instruments. That fact, combined with the
United States’ reluctance to ratify human rights treaties, provides some support for
the conventional view that the global diffusion of human rights norms exerted minimal
influence over constitutional change in the United States in the decades after World
War II. Nevertheless, we suggest that the true story is more complicated. There is
ample evidence that the political morality of human rights influenced key civil rights
leaders, such as Martin Luther King, Jr.37 and Thurgood Marshall.38 In the period from
1948 to 1976, a burgeoning moral commitment to the human rights principles of
equality and universality made it untenable to maintain the traditional federal system
in which every state decided for itself the scope of legal protection for inalienable
36 See DAVID SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 306–10 (2016).
37 See THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 326 (2007).
38 No scholar has yet undertaken a detailed study of the influence of international human
rights norms on the thinking of Justice Thurgood Marshall. We present some suggestive
evidence in Part IV. See infra Section IV.B. See also CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE
PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
1944–1955, at 94 (2003).
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rights. The moral commitment to universality required federal uniformity, and federal
uniformity required a transfer of power from the states to the federal government.
Although judges and legislators rarely cited international human rights instruments,
they frequently invoked the moral principles associated with international human
rights law—the political morality of human rights—to justify the exercise of federal
judicial or legislative power over matters previously reserved to the states.
I. CONSTRUCTING A LIST OF RIGHTS
We developed a single list of rights to provide a quantitative measurement of both
the federalization of human rights in the United States and the constitutionalization
of human rights in other countries. To be included, a right must be present in both the
UDHR and the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) database.39 Using the code-
book “Characteristics of National Constitutions” from the CCP database, we deter-
mined which rights in the CCP data correspond with specific UDHR rights. Some
rights in the UDHR do not appear in the CCP codebook. For example, Article 6 of the
UDHR states: “Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before
the law.”40 Since the CCP codebook does not include a corresponding right, Article 6
is excluded from our list of rights. Similarly, some rights in the CCP codebook do not
appear in the UDHR. For example, variable 521 addresses due process.41 The right
to due process is not specifically enumerated in the UDHR, so we do not include it
as a separate right.
Determining which rights appear in both the UDHR and the CCP codebook in-
volves some judgment calls. Two particular choices we made in constructing a list
of rights merit comment. The first choice relates to equality and non-discrimination.
Article 7 of the UDHR guarantees “equal protection of the law.”42 It corresponds to
variable 552 in the codebook. Article 2 of the UDHR bars discrimination based on
nine separate grounds, including race, color, sex, etc.43 We count each of those pro-
hibited grounds as a distinct right, corresponding to different elements in variable 553
in the codebook. Thus, our list of sixty-eight rights includes ten distinct rights related
to equality and non-discrimination. Given the central importance of non-discrimination
in modern international human rights law, we believe it is appropriate to include ten
separate antidiscrimination rights.
The second key choice relates to Article 11(1) of the UDHR. Article 11(1) identi-
fies “the right to be presumed innocent.”44 Counting the presumption of innocence as
a single right is straightforward. However, Article 11(1) also specifies that a criminal
39 See Elkins et al., supra note 14.
40 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 6.
41 Elkins et al., supra note 14, at 99.
42 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 7.
43 Id. art. 2.
44 Id. art. 11.
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defendant is entitled to “all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”45 The UDHR
does not specify which guarantees are necessary, but Article 14 of the ICCPR lists
those guarantees in detail.46 Our list of sixty-eight rights includes eight separate rights
that are encompassed within the phrase “all the guarantees necessary,” specifically
enumerated in Article 14 of the ICCPR and listed separately in the CCP codebook.
Those rights are: the right to a speedy trial; the right to confront witnesses; the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination; the ban on double jeopardy; the right to appeal; the
right to counsel; the right of indigent defendants to government-appointed counsel;
and the right to an interpreter.47 Since these criminal procedure rights figured promi-
nently in the federalization of human rights in the United States, we decided to count
each one separately.
Our coding produced a list of sixty-eight rights. Our list differs somewhat from
those produced in earlier, similar exercises. For example, Elkins, Ginsburg, and
Simmons constructed a list of seventy-four rights included in the CCP data, of which,
in their coding, the UDHR contained thirty-five.48 Using the same sources, Beck,
Meyer et al. generated a set of sixty-five human rights that are found in both the UDHR
and in CCP data.49 Our list differs somewhat from the Beck-Meyer set. Of the sixty-
eight rights in our list, Beck-Meyer include fifty-two.50 For twenty-seven UDHR rights,
we were unable to identify a corresponding CCP right; the Beck-Meyer list contains
thirteen of those.51 The preceding example regarding UDHR Article 11 illustrates the
potential for different coding results. Whereas we include eight distinct rights associated
with the phrase “all the guarantees necessary,” the Beck-Meyer list does not include any
of those rights. In contrast, whereas Beck-Meyer include rights named in the preamble
to the UDHR, we exclude the preamble as containing general principles or aspirations,
rather than specific rights. As another example, whereas Beck-Meyer match “the right
to change his nationality” (UDHR Article 15) to CCP variable 547, we do not. We do
not claim that one coding is more correct than the other. We do believe that our
coding provides a useful tool for measuring both the federalization of human rights
in the United States and the constitutionalization of human rights in other countries.
II. UDHR RIGHTS IN NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, laid the founda-
tion for the international human rights regime.52 The human rights treaties adopted
45 Id. art. 11.
46 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 14.
47 Id.
48 Zachary Elkins et al., Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Conver-
gence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT. L.J. 61, 76 (2013).
49 Colin J. Beck et al., Constitutions in World Society: A New Measure of Human Rights
8 (Jan. 27, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906946 [https://perma.cc/9GYS-DUCG].
50 Id. at 23–24.
51 Our complete list is in the Appendix.
52 See UDHR, supra note 6.
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since 1948 have generally clarified, developed, or extended rights identified in the
UDHR. The two covenants, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, were explicitly designed to
convert the high principles of the UDHR into “hard” law.53 Some treaties, such as the
Convention Against Torture (CAT), reinforced specific rights.54 Other treaties—such
as the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)—elaborated on
rights for specific populations.55
The UDHR has also shaped the development of rights in domestic constitutions.56
As Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons have argued, the UDHR “presented a broadly
accepted menu of rights viewed internationally as legitimate,” thus influencing “the
rights content of new constitutions that were adopted in its wake.”57 Rights enumerated
in the UDHR have appeared at an increasing rate in constitutions written since 1948.
This section looks briefly at the longer trend of their incorporation in constitutions
(1948–2013), then focuses more closely on the period from 1948 to 1976. Although the
growth in the number of UDHR rights in national constitutions occurred mostly after
1976, the growth that occurred between 1948 and 1976 was concentrated primarily
in countries that are similar to the United States. In particular, the constitutionalization
of human rights between 1948 and 1976 occurred mostly in western, democratic coun-
tries that existed as independent states before 1948.58 In contrast, there is little evi-
dence of constitutionalization before 1976 in non-western, non-democratic states that
gained independence after 1948.59 Thus, the federalization of human rights in the
United States between 1948 and 1976 was contemporaneous with the constitution-
alization of human rights in western, democratic countries.
A. The Full Human Rights Era, 1948–2013
Previous research has demonstrated the increasing incorporation of UDHR rights
into national constitutions over time. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons show the influ-
ence of the UDHR on constitutional rights in several ways. For instance, the similarity
53 ICCPR, supra note 26; ICESCR, supra note 27.
54 Convention Against Torture, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT].
55 Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
56 See Beck et al., supra note 49; Mila Versteeg, Law Versus Norms: The Impact of
Human-Rights Treaties on National Bills of Rights, 171 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 87
(2015) [hereinafter Versteeg, Law Versus Norms]; Elkins et al., supra note 48; David S. Law
& Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 762, 763 (2012).
57 Elkins et al., supra note 48, at 76.
58 See infra Figures 5–7 and accompanying text.
59 See infra Figures 5–7 and accompanying text.
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between new constitutions and the UDHR is greater after 1948 than before.60 In ad-
dition, the average percentage of UDHR rights included in constitutions rises dra-
matically after 1948.61 Finally, analyzing constitutions written after 1948 and a total
of seventy-three rights, they find that UDHR rights are more than one and one-half
times as likely as non-UDHR rights to be included.62 Beck, Meyer et al. report similar
findings. The average number of UDHR rights included in national constitutions rises
from about 15 in 1900, to 20 in 1948, to about 35 in 2013.63 They explain the rise in
terms of the influence of world society: the larger the number of global human rights
treaties in existence at the time of a constitution’s initial adoption, and the more of
those treaties a country has signed, the larger the number of UDHR rights the con-
stitution will include.64
Using our data on UDHR rights, we find the same broad trends. Figure 1 shows
that the number of UDHR rights included in national constitutions rises dramatically
after 1948. Note that for pre-1948 constitutions, “UDHR rights” refers to rights that
would eventually be included in the Universal Declaration. The average number of
UDHR rights in constitutions in 1947 was 11.5; by 2005 it reached a peak of 30.6,
after which it dropped slightly (to 27.6 in 2013).
Figure 1
60 Elkins et al., supra note 48, at 77.
61 Id. at 79.
62 Id. at 80.
63 Beck et al., supra note 49, at 10.
64 Id.
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We note two additional observations regarding the full time period. First, the
growth in the number of UDHR rights in national constitutions occurred mostly after
1976. This should not be surprising, because major waves of democratic transitions
and the expansion of the global human rights regime also occurred after 1976. The
period from about 1980 to 2000 included two major waves of democratization. The
first involved the end of civil wars and authoritarian rule and a shift toward demo-
cratic governance across much of Latin America.65 The second witnessed transitions
to democratic institutions across much of Central and Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union after 1990.66 Human rights figured prominently in virtually all of the
constitutions drafted in the democratic transitions of that era.
The period from 1976 onward also saw the consolidation and expansion of the
international human rights regime. Both the number of human rights treaties and the
number of states parties rose substantially. The two covenants entered into force in
1976, followed by CEDAW (1981), CAT (1987), and the CRC (1990).67 Some of
these treaties have now received nearly universal ratification. Figure 2 depicts the
growth in the cumulative number of states parties to ten core human rights treaties.68
The most rapid growth begins around 1980. The growth in the number of interna-
tional human rights instruments and in the number of state ratifications indicates the
development of an increasingly accepted set of core human rights. That set of rights
was available during the 1980–2000 period as a legitimized template for what a mod-
ern list of constitutional rights should include. Empirical research has shown that the
international and regional human rights treaties did in fact serve as a template for
constitutional rights provisions.69
65 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 56, at 799.
66 See id. at 792.
67 CRC, supra note 55; CAT, supra note 54; CEDAW, supra note 55.
68 The ten treaties included in Figure 2 are (as listed top to bottom in the figure):
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances
G.A. Res. 61/177 (2006); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 16,
2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 8, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; CRC, supra
note 55; CAT, supra note 54; CEDAW, supra note 55; ICESCR, supra note 27; ICCPR,
supra note 26; CERD, supra note 25; and Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 75 U.N.T.S. 277.
69 See Elkins et al., supra note 48, at 76; Versteeg, Law Versus Norms, supra note 56, at
91.
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Figure 2
A second observation regarding the average number of UDHR rights in national
constitutions concerns the immediate post-1948 period. Figure 1 shows that, for the
three decades beginning in 1948, the average number of UDHR rights in constitutions
did not change. The average in 1948 was 12.0 and in 1978 it was 12.0. There was a
marked increase from 1945 (7.3) to 1951 (13.2), followed by a significant drop between
1951 and 1960 (9.2), then a substantial recovery by 1964 (11.7). The early 1950s drop
and the lack of net growth in the average number of UDHR rights are also visible in
the data presented by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons.70 Thus, the trends we observe
for 1948–1976 are not simply artifacts of our coding. The averages, of course, can hide
contrary trends among different groups of states. That is, the average number of
UDHR rights in constitutions could well be declining for some states and rising for
others. In fact, that is what we find, as the next subsection reports.
B. A Closer Look at 1948–1976
Though the dramatic increase in UDHR rights in constitutions occurred after 1976,
the average level of UDHR rights was higher in the period 1948–1976 than in the
period 1918–1948. The decline in the early 1950s, noted above, occurred at an aver-
age level that was higher than in the preceding decades, as shown in Figure 3. The
70 Elkins et al., supra note 48, at 79.
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markers in Figure 3 represent the annual average of UDHR rights in constitutions;
the lines depict the linear best fit for each period. The average number of UDHR rights
was significantly higher after adoption of the UDHR, even though there was a slight
decline in that average from 1949 to 1976.
Figure 3
The averages mask the reality that in some states the number of UDHR rights in
the constitution declined from 1948 to 1976, but in others it increased. During that
period, numerous states amended or replaced their existing constitutions.71 Either
mechanism could increase or decrease the number of UDHR rights. We evaluate the
changes in UDHR rights to identify patterns regarding which states are increasing
UDHR rights and which states are decreasing them. To measure change, we take the
first year after 1947 in which a state appears in the CCP data. For some states this
is 1948, but for states achieving independence after decolonization, the first year in
which they appear in the data is the year they became independent states with new
constitutions. That year provides the beginning level of UDHR rights. The end year
is either 1976 or the last previous year in which data is available in the CCP data-
base. Subtracting the former from the latter provides the net change in UDHR rights.
Figure 4 displays the distribution of those values of net change for 153 states. The
width of each bar is three; for example, the tall middle bar represents states whose
71 Id. at 69.
1196 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1183
constitutions experienced a decline of one UDHR right, no change (0), or an increase
of one UDHR right. It is striking that the majority of states experienced virtually no
net change in UDHR rights over the period. The two wings of the histogram are nearly
balanced, with similar numbers of states undergoing a net decline in UDHR rights as
those registering a net gain. A slightly larger number of states experienced a decline,
which fits with the gradually decreasing post-1948 trend line in Figure 3.
Figure 4
The next step is to look more closely at which types of states underwent increases
and declines. Table 1 lists the ten largest declines and the ten largest net increases in
UDHR rights.
Table 1: Largest Declines and Increases in UDHR Rights
Country
Year of
independence
Change in
UDHR
rights
Number of
amendment
events
New 
constitutions
Start
year
End
year
Bottom 10
(net decrease)
Bangladesh 1971 -39 3 1 1972 1976
Bahrain 1971 -37 1 1 1973 1976
Lesotho 1966 -33 1 1 1966 1969
Malawi 1964 -32 9 2 1964 1976
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Country
Year of
independence
Change in
UDHR
rights
Number of
amendment
events
New 
constitutions
Start
year
End
year
Sierra Leone 1961 -32 5 1 1961 1976
Bolivia 1825 -30 1 2 1948 1976
Ecuador 1822 -30 4 1 1948 1976
Kenya 1963 -30 8 1 1963 1976
Vietnam 1954 -30 2 2 1956 1975
Trinidad And
Tobago 1962 -27 6 2 1962 1976
Top 10 
(net increase)
Gabon 1960 19 2 3 1960 1976
Portugal 1143 25 3 1 1948 1976
Zimbabwe 
(Rhodesia) 1965 26 3 2 1965 1976
Uganda 1962 32 3 3 1962 1970
German Federal
Republic 1955 33 18 1 1949 1976
Ghana 1957 33 2 3 1957 1971
Philippines 1946 33 1 1 1948 1976
Egypt 1922 34 1 2 1948 1976
Venezuela 1811 34 3 2 1948 1976
Italy 1861 41 4 0 1948 1976
Eight of the ten largest declines occurred in newly independent states. Those states
adopted initial constitutions with large numbers of UDHR rights (ranging from 27 to
39 rights), but then dropped many of those rights in subsequent amendments or new
constitutions. Five of the ten greatest increases occurred in older states. These lists
suggest that there may be differences between newly independent states and older,
established states in terms of how they incorporated UDHR rights during this period.
We placed the 153 states in groups, as shown in Figure 5. “New states” are those
that gained independence after 1947; “Other South” refers to developing countries that
were independent before 1948, excluding Latin American states; and “Western” in-
cludes Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
The other two categories are self-explanatory. Note that in three of the groups, the
largest category is that of no change in UDHR rights between 1948 and 1976. In three
groups—Communist, Latin American, and Western—more states registered an in-
crease in UDHR rights than experienced a decrease, with Western countries showing
the largest difference. Thus, the federalization of human rights in the United States
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between 1948 and 1976 was contemporaneous with the constitutionalization of human
rights in Western countries.
Figure 5
We also examined what happened with UDHR rights when states enacted new
constitutions. The drafting of a new constitution is an opportunity to borrow (or not)
from the menu of international human rights. Whereas the previous figures included
all constitutions in effect in a given year, the next two charts depict only new constitu-
tions (new “constitutional systems” in CCP terms). In Figure 6, we plot the number of
UDHR rights in new constitutions by the year in which they were approved, graphing
separately two groups of states: those that existed pre-1948 and those that became in-
dependent in 1948 or later. Each point plotted in the figure represents a newly enacted
constitution. Over the 1948–1976 period, new constitutions in newly independent states
show a declining tendency to incorporate UDHR rights. But among older states, the
opposite is true: new constitutions show an increasing tendency to incorporate UDHR
rights. Our dataset includes sixty-nine states that existed in 1947; we refer to them as
“old states.” Of these sixty-nine old states, forty-nine enacted at least one new con-
stitution during the 1948–1976 period, with a total of eighty-eight new constitutions.
The number of UDHR rights included in new constitutions enacted by old states rose
between 1948 and 1976. For old states, the average number of UDHR rights included
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in constitutions enacted in 1948 was 14; the average in new constitutions written in
1976 was 19—a more than thirty-three percent increase. Thus, countries that existed as
independent states before 1948 experienced significant constitutionalization of human
rights between 1948 and 1976, during the same time frame that the United States was
federalizing human rights.
Figure 6
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We also explore the intuition that constitutional incorporation of human rights
varies by regime type. Democracies, for instance, may be more inclined to include
rights protections in their constitutions. We employ data from the Varieties of De-
mocracy (V-Dem) Project to define regime categories.72 V-Dem includes a continu-
ous variable (v2x_polyarchy) composed of multiple components.73 We classified as
“democracies” those values of the variable above the 75th percentile. Values in the
25th–75th percentile range are categorized as “middle regimes,” and those below the
25th percentile are “autocracies.” Again looking only at new constitutions, we find
the expected pattern for democracies, namely, increasing inclusion of UDHR rights
between 1948 and 1976 (see Figure 7). Within the middle regime category, the trend
line is essentially flat, although a large number of new constitutions in this group in-
clude more than thirty UDHR rights. These are counterbalanced by a substantial num-
ber of new constitutions incorporating no UDHR rights at all. Among autocracies, there
is a slight trend toward including fewer UDHR rights in new constitutions over time,
though a number of new constitutions in this group include more than twenty UDHR
rights. Thus, the democratic countries that are most similar to the United States were
constitutionalizing human rights between 1948 and 1976, during roughly the same
time period that the United States was federalizing human rights.
72 Michael Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Dataset—Version 8, VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY
PROJECT (2018), http://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 [https://perma.cc/7QEH-E724].
73 See id.
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Finally, we also examine the incorporation of specific rights. That is, our unit of
interest becomes not the state or the constitution, but the specific UDHR right. We
compare the average number of new and amended constitutions that included a par-
ticular right before 1948 to the same average for 1948–1976. Rights appearing in the
lower part of Figure 8 were uncommon in constitutions before 1948; rights in the
upper portion of the graph were quite common before 1948. The vast majority of
UDHR rights (60 out of 68) show growth in constitutional incorporation. The eight
exceptions are: the right to marry, the right to equality of parentage, intellectual
property rights, the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of property, the prohibition
of slavery, the right against self-incrimination, the right to privacy in the home and
correspondence, and freedom of the press. It bears emphasis that the graph covers
the period only up to 1976, that is, the early decades of the human rights era. If we ex-
tend the data to 2013, all of the UDHR rights are more commonly included in con-
stitutions written or amended after 1948 than before. Table 2 shows the ten rights
with the smallest difference in constitutional inclusion (pre- and post-1948) as well
as the ten rights with the largest increase. It bears emphasis that the right to racial
equality was the single right manifesting the greatest degree of constitutionalization
between 1948 and 1976. This fact is significant because the prohibition on racial
discrimination is one of the core defining characteristics of the political morality of
human rights.
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Figure 8
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Table 2: Percentage of new & amended constitutions including a UDHR right
Pre-1948 1948–1976 Change
Smallest increases
Home & correspondence 20.5 13.9 -6.6
Intellectual property 7.8 2.7 -5.2
Press 21.5 16.9 -4.5
Slavery 13.6 9.8 -3.8
Self-incrimination 15.6 14.6 -1.0
Marry 1.8 1.0 -0.9
Equality: parentage 3.1 2.7 -0.5
Arbitrary deprivation property 12.2 11.9 -0.3
Nationality 0.0 0.2 0.2
Free education 20.2 20.5 0.3
Largest increases
Freedom of opinion 12.6 22.9 10.3
Right to participate in culture 4.3 14.6 10.3
Financial support old age 7.7 18.0 10.3
Dignity 1.7 12.6 10.9
Equality of nationality 3.7 14.6 11.0
Financial support disabled 6.2 17.9 11.7
Equality of religion 4.9 18.0 13.2
Equality of gender 5.6 20.9 15.3
Right to join trade unions 8.1 23.7 15.6
Equality of race 5.2 23.0 17.8
III. FEDERALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Professor Ackerman and other scholars have written about the civil rights revo-
lution in the United States.74 Professor Tushnet has written about the “New Deal—
Great Society” constitutional regime.75 Here, we emphasize that the constitutional
74 See ACKERMAN, supra note 1.
75 See Mark Tushnet, Foreward: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening
of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 30 (1999); see also Mark Tushnet,
Federalism and International Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order, 47 WAYNE
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revolution that produced the New Deal—Great Society regime was not merely a civil
rights revolution; it was a human rights revolution. Not only did the human rights rev-
olution expand the scope of protection for human rights in the United States, it also
transferred regulatory authority over human rights from the states to the federal gov-
ernment. We refer to that transfer of authority as the “federalization of human rights.”
The federalization of human rights altered the balance of power between the states and
the federal government for both civil/political rights and economic/social rights.
Part III documents the federalization of human rights in the United States between
1930 and 1976. To measure federalization, we classify rights into four categories: ex-
clusive state authority (ES); concurrent authority, state primacy (SP); concurrent author-
ity, federal primacy (FP); and exclusive federal authority (EF). For all sixty-eight rights
in the data set, we present snapshots at three different points in time: 1930, 1948, and
1976. For any particular right, “federalization” occurs when classification of that right
changes from weaker to stronger federal control. Classification of rights as ES or EF
is fairly straightforward. Drawing distinctions between SP and FP is more problematic.
However, we adopted a simple default rule: if there is a roughly equal balance between
state and federal control, we classify the right as SP (state primacy). This conserva-
tive approach avoids overstating the degree of federalization. Figure 9 summarizes
federalization over time. The vertical axis measures the number of rights at specific
points in time that fit into each of the four categories. Overall, the data demonstrates
a significant transfer of regulatory authority over human rights from the states to the
federal government between 1930 and 1976.
Figure 9
The claim that the federal government assumed greater control over protection of
individual rights after 1930 is not novel. Even so, the quantitative analysis presented
L. REV. 841 (2001) [hereinafter Tushnet, Federalism and International Human Rights in the
New Constitutional Order].
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here is novel in three respects. First, quantification shows that the degree of federal-
ization was perhaps even more dramatic than is generally assumed. Second, whereas
many scholarly accounts of American constitutional history emphasize the 1930s as
the critical period for expansion of federal power,76 our data show that the greatest
expansion of federal control over human rights occurred after 1948.77 Third, conven-
tional accounts of U.S. constitutional history understate the degree to which federal-
ization affected economic/social rights as well as civil/political rights (as shown in
Section III.D).
As noted in the Introduction, three primary mechanisms drove the process of fed-
eralization: congressional legislation, judicial recognition of unenumerated rights, and
incorporation. Incorporation doctrine merits a brief explanation. The Bill of Rights is
a set of constitutional amendments adopted in 1791. Those amendments protect nu-
merous rights included in the UDHR.78 However, as originally understood, the Bill of
Rights merely protected rights against infringement by the federal government; it did
not preclude state governments from infringing those rights.79 “Incorporation doctrine”
consists of a series of Supreme Court decisions holding that specific provisions of the
Bill of Rights are binding on the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.80 The Due Process Clause “incorporates” those rights and makes them
binding on the states. Sixteen of the sixty-eight rights in our data set are included in
the Bill of Rights. All sixteen rights are subject to concurrent state and federal regu-
latory authority. We classify those rights as “state primacy” before they were incor-
porated. We classify them as “federal primacy” after they were incorporated because
incorporation transferred substantial control over those rights from the states to the
federal courts.81
Part III is divided into five sections. The first section addresses twenty of sixty-
eight rights (29%) that were not federalized between 1930 and 1976. The next section
discusses thirteen of sixty-eight rights (19%) that were federalized between 1930 and
1948. The third section analyzes thirty-five of sixty-eight rights (51%) that were fed-
eralized between 1948 and 1976. The fourth section demonstrates that federalization
affected both civil/political rights and economic/social rights. The final section con-
tends that the balance between state and federal authority over human rights has not
changed substantially since 1976. Thus, as depicted in Figure 9, the period from 1948
to 1976 was the key period for federalization of human rights.
76 See Tushnet, Federalism and International Human Rights in the New Constitutional
Order, supra note 75, at 842.
77 Accord PRIMUS, supra note 3.
78 See David Sloss, Incorporation, Federalism, and International Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS: AN AMERICAN STORY (Austin Sarat ed., 2017).
79 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).
80 See AMAR, supra note 18, at 6–7.
81 See Sloss, supra note 78, at 77.
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A. Rights That Were Not Federalized Between 1930 and 1976
Twenty of the sixty-eight rights in our data set were not federalized after 1930. In
other words, the federal government exercised no greater control over those rights in
1976 than it did in 1930. Those twenty rights can be divided into three groups: nine
rights that were subject to exclusive or primary federal authority before 1930; nine
rights that remained subject to exclusive state authority throughout the relevant time
period; and two rights that we classify as “state primacy” throughout the relevant time
period. Notably, nine of the twenty rights that were not federalized after 1930 were
already federalized previously. In other words, only eleven of the sixty-eight rights
were not federalized by 1976. Table 3 summarizes key information about rights that
were not federalized after 1930.
Consider, first, rights that remained subject to exclusive state authority. UDHR
Article 27(1) guarantees “the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the
community” and the right “to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”82 Arti-
cle 26(1) specifies that “[e]lementary education shall be compulsory.”83 Article 24 guar-
antees a right to “periodic holidays with pay.”84 Article 23(1) promises “free choice
of employment.”85 Article 22 provides that everyone has a right to “the free develop-
ment of his personality.”86 All six of these rights are economic/social rights, not civil/
political rights. As of 1976, no federal constitutional or statutory provisions protected
these rights. The scope of state regulation varies widely. In theory, though, states have
the authority to regulate all these rights pursuant to their general police powers.87
Table 3: Rights That Were Not Federalized After 1930
UDHR
Article Right
In Text of
Const?
As of
1930
As of
1948
As of
1976
2 Equality of creed/beliefs No ES ES ES
12 Protect honor/reputation No ES ES ES
16 Equal rights in marriage No ES ES ES
22 Free develop personality No ES ES ES
24 Holidays with pay No ES ES ES
23(1) Free choice of employment No ES ES ES
26(1) Compulsory education No ES ES ES
82 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 27(1).
83 Id. art. 26(1).
84 Id. art. 24.
85 Id. art. 23(1).
86 Id. art. 22.
87 Under the U.S. constitutional system, the federal government is a government of lim-
ited, enumerated powers, but state legislatures have plenary authority to enact legislation to
promote the general welfare.
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UDHR
Article Right
In Text of
Const?
As of
1930
As of
1948
As of
1976
27(1) Scientific progress No ES ES ES
27(1) Right to participate in culture No ES ES ES
21(2) Access to public service No SP SP SP
17(1) Right to own property No SP SP SP
19 Freedom of expression 1st Am FP FP FP
17(2) Deprive property 5th Am FP FP FP
4 Prohibit slavery, servitude 13th Am FP FP FP
7 Equal protection of law 14th Am FP FP FP
13 Free movement Art. IV(2) FP FP FP
11(2) No ex post facto law Art. I(10) FP FP FP
14 Right to seek asylum No EF EF EF
27(2) Intellectual property, general No EF EF EF
15 Deprive nationality No EF EF EF
Three other rights in our set of sixty-eight rights also remained subject to exclu-
sive state control, even though they are civil/political rights, not economic/social
rights. UDHR Article 16(1) specifies that men and women “are entitled to equal rights
as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.”88 State laws provide substan-
tial protection for equal marital rights, but federal law does not regulate this particular
right.89 UDHR Article 12 states: “No one shall be subjected to . . . attacks upon his
honour and reputation.”90 State defamation laws protect this right, but there is no federal
defamation law in the United States.91 UDHR Article 2 prohibits discrimination based
on “political or other opinion.”92 Federal civil rights statutes prohibit discrimination
on the basis of race, gender, religion, and national origin.93 However, those statutes
do not explicitly address discrimination based on political opinion, and the Supreme
88 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 16(1).
89 Our set of sixty-eight rights includes three distinct rights related to marriage and pro-
creation that are linked to UDHR Article 16. The Supreme Court federalized the right to
procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Court federalized the right to
interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See infra note 227–28 and
accompanying text. The right to be free from gender-based discrimination is also a distinct
right subject to federal control. See infra notes 317–21 and accompanying text. The specific
rights at issue here are associated with Married Women’s Property Acts that states adopted
in the nineteenth century. Those rights have not been federalized.
90 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 12.
91 The First Amendment establishes constitutional limits on state defamation laws. See
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). However, the First Amendment does
not provide federal constitutional protection for reputational harms.
92 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 2.
93 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2001).
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Court has never recognized political opinion as a “suspect classification” under the
Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, as a matter of custom, elected officials in both
state and federal governments have broad discretion to discriminate based on political
opinion when deciding whom to hire for senior appointed positions.
We classify two rights as “state primacy” throughout the relevant time period.
UDHR Article 21(2) states: “Everyone has the right of equal access to public service
in his country.”94 Federal civil service laws, which date to the nineteenth century,
protect this right for federal employees and those who seek federal employment.95
However—aside from general antidiscrimination statutes, which implicate other rights
addressed separately in this Article—federal law does not regulate state governments
in this respect. Every state has its own rules for state employees that operate in parallel
with federal rules governing federal employees. UDHR Article 17(1) states: “Every-
one has the right to own property.”96 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the federal government and state governments, respectively, from depriving individ-
uals of property without due process of law.97 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 guarantees
all citizens “the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”98
Despite this overlay of federal regulation, the right to own property is regulated pri-
marily by state law in the United States.
Three of the sixty-eight rights in our data set are classified as “exclusively fed-
eral” throughout the relevant time period. Article 27(2) protects the rights of authors
and inventors to the “material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production.”99 The federal government exercises exclusive authority over patents and
copyrights. Relying on its power to enact laws “to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts,”100 Congress enacted the first federal patent and copyright laws in
1790.101 Article 14 protects “the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution.”102 Article 15 specifies that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his nationality.”103 The federal government augmented protection for both of these
rights after 1948.104 However, in doing so, the federal government was not displacing
94 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 21(2).
95 See Civil Service Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403 (Jan. 16, 1883).
96 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 17(1).
97 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
98 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1991). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)
(upholding the validity of Section 1982 as a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the
Thirteenth Amendment).
99 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 27(2).
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
101 See Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (April 10, 1790); Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124
(May 31, 1790).
102 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 14(1).
103 Id. art. 15(2).
104 The Supreme Court established federal constitutional limits on arbitrary deprivation of
nationality in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) and Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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pre-existing state law. States exercised a degree of independent control over immigra-
tion until the 1880s.105 Since the late nineteenth century, though, the plenary power
doctrine has granted the federal government exclusive control over matters related to
immigration and nationality.106
Finally, six other rights were subject to concurrent authority, with federal primacy,
throughout the relevant time period. Two such rights were included in the original
Constitution. UDHR Article 11(2) states: “No one shall be held guilty of any penal of-
fence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offense . . .
at the time when it was committed.”107 That provision corresponds to the Ex Post
Facto Clause in Article I, section 10 of the Constitution.108 UDHR Article 13 provides:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each State.”109 That clause corresponds to the Privileges and Immunities Clause in
Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution.110 Since the mid-nineteenth century, if not
earlier, the Privileges and Immunities Clause has protected the individual right to
move freely between states.111 Both freedom of movement and ex post facto punish-
ment are subject to state regulation, but the Constitution establishes federal primacy
over those rights.
The Civil War Amendments established federal primacy over two additional rights.
UDHR Article 4 specifies that “[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude.”112
Article 4 corresponds to the Thirteenth Amendment, which states: “Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction.”113 UDHR Article 7 states: “All are equal before the law and are
The United States acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1968, the
most important international treaty related to the right to asylum. 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1968).
Congress enhanced protection for asylum rights in the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
212, 94 Stat. 102 (March 17, 1980).
105 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
106 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 113–14, 119–27 (5th ed. 2009). But see infra notes 357–63 and accompanying
text (noting that certain rights related to immigration law, which were previously subject to
exclusive federal control, are now subject to concurrent state authority).
107 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 11(2).
108 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.”). A
similar Ex Post Facto Clause is included in Article I, Section 9 as a limitation on the federal
government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
109 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 13.
110 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
111 See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 47 (1868) (“[T]he right of passing through a State by
a citizen of the United States is one guaranteed to him by the Constitution.”); The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (“We are all citizens of the United
States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.”).
112 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 4.
113 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.”114 Article 7 corre-
sponds to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, which states: “No
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”115 The prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude and the guarantee of
equal protection are both subject to concurrent state regulation. However, the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments established federal primacy over those rights.
The Supreme Court’s earliest incorporation decisions established federal primacy
over two other rights before 1930. The Court decided in 1897 that the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause is binding on the states.116 That decision established federal primacy
over the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property.117 The Court decided
in 1925 that the First Amendment Free Speech Clause is binding on the states.118
That decision established federal primacy over the right to freedom of expression
in Article 19 of the UDHR.
B. Federalization of Human Rights Between 1930 and 1947
Between 1935 and 1938, Congress enacted several statutes that can fairly be de-
scribed as federal human rights legislation. (The Supreme Court had previously in-
validated several other federal “human rights” statutes.119) Meanwhile, between 1931
and 1940, the Supreme Court incorporated four other rights in the Bill of Rights.120
Additionally, in the early 1940s, the Court decided two cases establishing federal
constitutional protection for UDHR rights that are not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution.121 Overall, between 1930 and 1947, Congress and the Supreme Court
federalized thirteen of the sixty-eight rights under review.122 However, the degree of
federalization was not uniform. Two of the thirteen rights moved from “exclusive state
authority” to “concurrent authority, state primacy.” Four others moved from state
114 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 7.
115 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Our data set includes four other rights—in addition to
the Article 7 equal protection right—that are linked to the Fourteenth Amendment. They are:
non-discrimination on the basis of race (UDHR, art. 2), non-discrimination on the basis of
color (UDHR, art. 2); the right to life (UDHR, art. 3); and the prohibition on arbitrary depri-
vation of property (UDHR, art. 17(2)). We discuss arbitrary deprivation of property in the
next paragraph. We discuss the other rights in Section III.C.
116 Chicago B&Q R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
117 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 17(2).
118 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
119 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating a law establishing
maximum working hours and minimum wages in coal mines); Hammer v. Dagenhart (The
Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a federal statute that imposed restric-
tions on child labor).
120 See infra notes 151–59 and accompanying text.
121 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
122 See Table 4.
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primacy to federal primacy. Seven of the thirteen rights underwent more radical federal-
ization, shifting from exclusive state authority to federal primacy. Table 4 summarizes
information about the thirteen rights federalized during this period. The following
discussion begins with federalization by congressional legislation. We then address
rights federalized by Supreme Court decisions.
Congress enacted the Social Security Act123 and the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)124 in 1935. Soon thereafter, it adopted the Housing Act of 1937125 and the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).126 All four statutes established federal protection
for rights later included in the UDHR. Titles I and II of the Social Security Act created
federal programs to provide financial support for the elderly;127 those provisions es-
tablish federal protection for rights recognized in UDHR Article 25(1).128 Title III of
the Social Security Act provided federal funding for state unemployment compensa-
tion laws and made that funding contingent on compliance with federal standards.129
Thus, Title III established federal standards for the Article 25 “right to security in the
event of unemployment.”130 Title IV of the Social Security Act provided federal fund-
ing for states “to furnish financial assistance . . . to needy dependent children” and
made that funding contingent upon state compliance with federal standards.131 Thus,
Title IV created a federal program (later known as “Aid to Families with Dependent
Children,” or AFDC132) corresponding to UDHR Article 25(2).
Table 4: Federalization of Human Rights Between 1930 and 1947
UDHR
Article Right
In Text of
Const?
Fed’lize
Process
As of
1930
As of
1948
As of
1976
25(1) Housing No Statute ES SP SP
24 Limitation of working hours No Statute ES FP FP
23(3) Just remuneration No Statute ES FP FP
23(4) Right to join trade unions No Statute ES FP FP
25(1)
Financial support
unemployed No Statute ES FP FP
25(1) Right to social security No Statute ES FP FP
123 Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (Aug. 14, 1935).
124 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (July 5, 1935).
125 Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (Sept. 1, 1937).
126 Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (June 25, 1938).
127 See 49 Stat. at 620–25 (Aug. 14, 1935).
128 See UDHR, supra note 6, art. 25(1). See also UDHR, supra note 6, art. 22.
129 See 49 Stat. at 626–27.
130 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 25(1). See also UDHR, supra note 6, art. 23(1).
131 See §§ 401–06, 49 Stat. at 627–29.
132 See Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(2), 76 Stat. 185 (1962).
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UDHR
Article Right
In Text of
Const?
Fed’lize
Process
As of
1930
As of
1948
As of
1976
25(2) Financial support children No Statute ES FP FP
16 Right to found family No Interp ES SP SP
19 Freedom of opinion No Interp ES FP FP
18 Freedom of thought, religion 1st Am Incorp SP FP FP
19 Freedom of press 1st Am Incorp SP FP FP
20 Freedom of assembly 1st Am Incorp SP FP FP
11(1) Right to counsel 6th Am Incorp SP FP FP
Section 7 of the NLRA creates a federal right for employees “to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing.”133 Thus, the NLRA protects “the right to form and to join trade
unions” in UDHR Article 23(4).134 The FLSA created federal standards for minimum
wages and maximum working hours;135 those provisions established federal protec-
tion for “the right to just and favourable remuneration” in Article 23(3)136 and the right
to “reasonable limitation of working hours” in Article 24.137 The Housing Act of 1937
created several federal programs designed to help the states “remedy the unsafe and
insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary
dwellings for families of low income . . . that are injurious to the health, safety, and
morals of the citizens of the Nation.”138 The statute established federal protection for
the right to adequate housing included in UDHR Article 25(1).
Under the constitutional standards that prevailed before 1935, all the statutory
provisions summarized in the previous paragraphs were probably unconstitutional.
Shortly after Congress enacted the statutes, petitioners challenged the constitutional-
ity of the NLRA, the Social Security Act, and the FLSA, arguing that Congress had
exceeded the scope of its enumerated powers and invaded the reserved powers of the
States. In a series of decisions between 1937 and 1941, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of all three statutes. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,139 the Court
held that the NLRA was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause.140 The dissenters141 argued forcefully that the majority decision was at odds
with recent decisions in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States142 and Carter v.
133 Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935).
134 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 23(4).
135 Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 6–8, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062–65 (1938).
136 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 23(3).
137 Id. art. 24.
138 Pub. L. No. 75-412, § 1, 50 Stat. 888 (1937).
139 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
140 Id.
141 See id. at 76 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
142 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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Carter Coal Co.,143 but the majority brushed aside those objections. In Charles C.
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis144 and Helvering v. Davis,145 the Court rebuffed various
challenges to the Social Security Act, holding that the Act was a valid exercise of
Congress’s Spending Power.146 The dissenters in Steward Machine Co. argued that the
Act invaded the reserved powers of the states and violated the Tenth Amendment.147
Finally, in United States v. Darby,148 the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to
the FLSA, holding that it was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Power.149
All seven statutory rights summarized above were subject to exclusive state regu-
latory authority before 1930. By 1941, though, after the Court’s decision in Darby, all
seven rights were subject to concurrent state and federal authority. Reasonable minds
could differ about which rights qualify as “state primacy” and which ones qualify
as “federal primacy.” We classify the right to housing as “state primacy” because the
Housing Act of 1937 established relatively weak federal control over housing rights.150
We classify the other six rights as “federal primacy” because the NLRA, the FLSA,
and the Social Security Act created a high degree of federal uniformity for those
rights, while also leaving states a degree of flexibility in implementation.
The First Amendment to the Constitution and UDHR Article 19 protect freedom
of the press.151 The Supreme Court decided in 1931 that the Free Press Clause is bind-
ing on the states.152 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and UDHR Article 11
protect the right to counsel.153 The Court decided in 1932 that the right to counsel is
binding on the states.154 The First Amendment and UDHR Article 20 protect freedom
of assembly.155 The Court decided in 1937 that the right of peaceful assembly is
binding on the states.156 Finally, the First Amendment and UDHR Article 18 protect
freedom of religion.157 The Court decided in 1940 that the Free Exercise Clause is
binding on the states.158 For all four rights incorporated between 1931 and 1940, the
143 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
144 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
145 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
146 See supra notes 144–45.
147 See 301 U.S. at 598 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 610 (Sutherland, J., dissenting);
id. at 616 (Butler, J., dissenting).
148 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
149 Id. 
150 See Pub. L. No. 412, 5 Stat. 888 (1937).
151 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; UDHR, supra note 6, art. 19.
152 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
153 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; UDHR, supra note 6, art. 11(1). See supra Part I (discussing
Article 11(1)).
154 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
155 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; UDHR, supra note 6, art. 20(1).
156 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
157 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; UDHR, supra note 6, art. 18.
158 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Court also incorporated the Estab-
lishment Clause in 1947. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Establishment
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Court’s decisions shifted the degree of federal control from “state primacy” to “fed-
eral primacy.”159 Yet, as of 1947, most rights in the Bill of Rights did not bind the
states.160 With a few exceptions, the Bill of Rights continued to operate—as it had
since the Founding—as a constraint on the federal government, not a source of legal
protection for universal, inalienable rights.
UDHR Article 19 states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion.”161 Article 18 states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion.”162 The First Amendment explicitly protects freedom of expression and
freedom of religion, but it does not explicitly protect freedom of opinion or thought.163
The key distinction is that freedom of opinion/thought protects purely private rumi-
nations, whereas freedom of expression and freedom of religion protect the public
manifestations of those opinions.164 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette165
invalidated a state rule requiring all pupils to participate in a flag salute ceremony.166
The Court held that the rule violated the First Amendment even though it did not pro-
hibit any speech or any public manifestation of religious belief.167 Justice Jackson said:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . . We
think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag sa-
ute and pledge . . . invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which
it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control.168
Barnette was the first Supreme Court decision establishing federal constitutional
protection for freedom of opinion. Barnette established federal primacy over a right
previously subject to exclusive state regulatory authority.
Clause is not included in our list of sixty-eight rights because there is no comparable provi-
sion in the UDHR.
159 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
160 See Sloss, supra note 78, at 10.
161 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 19.
162 Id. art. 18.
163 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
164 The CCP codebook classifies “freedom of religion,” “freedom of expression,” and
“freedom of opinion, thought, and/or conscience” as three distinct rights. Elkins et al., supra
note 14.
165 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Professors Sullivan and Gunther treat Barnette as an example of
the right not to speak. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1140–42 (17th ed. 2010). They acknowledge that the right not to speak is not “separately
enumerated in the First Amendment.” Id. at 1140.
166 Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 642.
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UDHR Article 16 states: “Men and women of full age . . . have the right to marry
and to found a family.”169 The right to “marry” and the right to “found a family” are
distinct rights. The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention either. An early
draft of the UDHR specified that “[m]en and women shall have equal rights as to
marriage,” but did not address the right to found a family.170 Rene Cassin, the French
representative to the Commission on Human Rights, proposed the phrase “to found
a family” in June 1948.171 The delegates approved his proposal.172 Mr. Cassin empha-
sized “the importance of the fundamental right of a human being to found a family,”173
but he never explained the scope of that right. On its face, the right “to found a family”
seems, at a minimum, to include the right to procreate. The UN Human Rights
Committee affirmed this understanding in a comment on Article 23 of the ICCPR,
which also protects the right “to found a family.”174 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,175 the
Supreme Court invalidated a state law authorizing forced sterilization of certain
criminals.176 The Court declared that procreation is “one of the basic civil rights of
man” that is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”177 Thus,
Skinner was the first Supreme Court decision to recognize a federal right “to found
a family.” Even so, federal control remains weak. Given traditional state autonomy
in family law matters, we classify the right to found a family as “concurrent authority,
state primacy.”
C. Federalization of Human Rights Between 1948 and 1976
The period between the adoption of the Universal Declaration in 1948 and the
entry into force of the two Covenants in 1976 coincided with a dramatic expansion of
federal power over human rights in the United States. During this period, the Supreme
Court incorporated ten distinct rights from the Bill of Rights that are included in our
list of sixty-eight rights. Through expansive interpretation of the First, Fourth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court also established federal constitutional protec-
tion for nine other, unenumerated rights. Meanwhile, Congress passed laws creating
federal statutory protection for nine additional rights. Finally, seven other rights were
federalized through some mixture of legislative and judicial action and constitutional
169 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 16.
170 2 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES 1603–08 (2013).
171 Id. at 1751–53.
172 Id. at 1786–88.
173 1 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES 859 (2013).
174 See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, 39 Human Rights Comm.,
Gen. Comment No. 19, ¶ 5 (July 27, 1990); ICCPR, art. 23, ¶ 2.
175 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 541.
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amendments. Overall, the federal government augmented its control over thirty-five
of the sixty-eight rights in our data set during this period.
Table 5: Federalization of Human Rights Between 1948 and 1976
UDHR
Article Right
In Text of
Const?
Fed’lize
Process
As of
1930
As of
1948
As of
1976
2 Equality of language No Statute ES ES SP
26(1) Free education No Statute ES ES SP
26(1) Equal access higher ed No Statute ES ES SP
23(1)
Just and favorable condi-
tions No Statute ES ES FP
25(1) Financial support disabled No Statute ES ES FP
25(1) Health care No Statute ES ES FP
2 Equality of religion No Statute ES ES FP
25(1) Standard of living No Statute ES SP FP
2 Equality of nationality No Statute SP SP FP
16 Right to marry No Interp ES ES SP
11(1) Right to interpreter No Interp ES ES SP
2 Equality of parentage No Interp ES ES FP
12 Non-interfere privacy No Interp ES ES FP
20 Freedom of association No Interp ES ES FP
11(1) Presumption of innocence No Interp ES ES FP
11(1) State pays for counsel No Interp ES ES FP
11(1) Right to appeal No Interp ES ES FP
1 Dignity No Interp ES ES FP
5 Cruel treatment 8th Am Incorp SP SP FP
5 Torture 8th Am Incorp SP SP FP
9 Arbitrary arrest, detention 4th Am Incorp SP SP FP
10 Fair trial 5th, 6th Incorp SP SP FP
10 Public trial 6th Am Incorp SP SP FP
12 Home, correspondence 4th Am Incorp SP SP FP
11(1) Double jeopardy 5th Am Incorp SP SP FP
11(1) Self-incrimination 5th Am Incorp SP SP FP
11(1) Confront witnesses 6th Am Incorp SP SP FP
11(1) Speedy trial 6th Am Incorp SP SP FP
2 Equality of gender No Mixed SP SP FP
2 Equality of race 14th Am Mixed SP SP FP
2 Equality of color 14th Am Mixed SP SP FP
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UDHR
Article Right
In Text of
Const?
Fed’lize
Process
As of
1930
As of
1948
As of
1976
21(3) Universal adult suffrage Various Mixed SP SP FP
2
Equality property owner-
ship No Mixed SP SP FP
3 Right to life 14th Am Mixed SP SP FP
8 Right to a remedy No Mixed SP SP FP
As was true in the 1930–47 period, the degree of federalization varied among the
rights federalized between 1948 and 1976. Nineteen of the thirty-five rights moved
from “state primacy” to “federal primacy.” Eleven other rights underwent more radi-
cal federalization, shifting from exclusive state authority to federal primacy. Five other
rights shifted from exclusive state authority to state primacy. Table 5 summarizes
information about the thirty-five rights federalized during this period. The following
analysis of those rights is divided into four subsections: incorporation, unenumerated
rights, federal statutes, and mixed federalization processes.
1. Federalization by Incorporation
In a series of decisions between 1948 and 1971, the Court decided that every right
in the Bill of Rights that has an analogue in the UDHR is binding on the states. The
Court never cited the UDHR in its incorporation decisions. However, the Court repeat-
edly said that only “fundamental rights” bind the states under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.178 In practice, the concept of fundamental rights that guided the Court’s decisions
was quite similar to the concept embodied in the UDHR and very different from the
concept of fundamental rights that the Court applied before World War II.179
UDHR Article 5 prohibits torture and “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”180 We count “torture” and “cruel treatment” as two distinct rights.181 The
Court made both rights binding on the states when it held in Robinson v. California182
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.183 UDHR Article 9 prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention.184
178 See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
179 See infra Section IV.C.
180 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 5.
181 The rights to be free from “torture” and “cruel treatment” are generally treated as dis-
tinct rights under international human rights law. They are also classified as distinct rights
in the CCP codebook. See Elkins et al., supra note 14.
182 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
183 Id.
184 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 9.
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Article 12 states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence.”185 Similarly, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”186 The
Court made the substance of Articles 9 and 12 binding on the states by incorporating
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and the Fourth Amendment ban on “un-
reasonable searches and seizures.”187 UDHR Article 10 provides that everyone is en-
titled to “a fair and public hearing.”188 Similarly, the Sixth Amendment provides for
both a “public trial” and “an impartial jury.”189 The Court held in In re Oliver190 that
the right to a public trial is binding on the states.191 In Irvin v. Dowd,192 the Court as-
sumed without deciding that the right to an impartial jury—which corresponds to the
Article 10 right to a fair hearing—binds the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.193
UDHR Article 11(1) provides that “[e]veryone charged with a penal offence” is
entitled to “all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”194 For reasons explained pre-
viously, we identify eight distinct rights that are encompassed within the phrase “all
the guarantees necessary.” The Supreme Court incorporated four of those rights in the
1960s.195 Malloy v. Hogan196 incorporated the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause, which corresponds to ICCPR Article 14(3)(g).197 Pointer v. Texas198 incorpo-
rated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, which corresponds to ICCPR Arti-
cle 14(3)(e).199 Klopfer v. North Carolina200 incorporated the Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial, which corresponds to ICCPR Article 14(3)(c).201 Finally, Benton v.
Maryland202 incorporated the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, which cor-
responds to ICCPR Article 14(7).203
185 Id. art. 12.
186 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
187 See id.; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (incorporating the warrant requirement);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the Search and Seizure Clause).
188 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 10.
189 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
190 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
191 Id.
192 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
193 Id.
194 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 11(1).
195 The Court incorporated a fifth right, the right to counsel, in the 1930s. Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932). We address the other three rights—the right to appeal, the right to an in-
terpreter, and the state’s duty to pay for an attorney—in the section on unenumerated rights.
196 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
197 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 14(3)(g).
198 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
199 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 14(3)(e).
200 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
201 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 14(3)(c).
202 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
203 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 14(7).
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In sum, the Court’s incorporation decisions between 1948 and 1976 expanded fed-
eral power over ten distinct human rights: the prohibitions on torture, cruel treatment,
arbitrary arrest, and arbitrary interference with the home and correspondence; the rights
to a fair trial, a public trial, and a speedy trial; the right to confront adverse witnesses;
and restrictions on self-incrimination and double jeopardy. For all ten rights incor-
porated between 1948 and 1976, the Court’s decisions shifted the degree of federal
control from “state primacy” to “federal primacy.”
2. Judicial Recognition of Unenumerated Rights
Between 1948 and 1976, U.S. courts established federal constitutional protection
for nine additional rights that are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution’s text.
Eight of those rights are based on Supreme Court decisions. The ninth, the right to
an interpreter, never reached the Supreme Court, but the right is firmly established
in decisions by federal appellate courts. Two of the key Supreme Court decisions ex-
pressly use the term “human rights” to help justify constitutional protection for
unenumerated rights.204
The first right in this group—the right to be treated with dignity—might be called
a “principle” rather than a “right.” We include it in our list of sixty-eight rights be-
cause dignity is a foundational principle in the UDHR.205 Moreover, as Professors
Resnik and Suk explain:
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Supreme Court
mentioned the word “dignity” only in terms of entities such as
sovereigns and courts. . . . It was not until the 1940s . . . that the
Court embraced dignity as something possessed by individuals.
Since then, the Court has embedded the term dignity in interpre-
tations of the U.S. Constitution.206
The first Supreme Court opinion linking “dignity” to the Bill of Rights was a dis-
senting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in 1942.207 The concept of dignity became
entrenched in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in 1958 when Chief Justice Warren
204 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (stating that the right to counsel
“is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental
human rights of life and liberty”); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (stating that a
search “without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police” must be “con-
demned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the
basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.”).
205 The first clause of the Preamble refers to “the inherent dignity . . . of all members of
the human family.” The word “dignity” also appears in Article 1, Article 22, and Article 23.
See UDHR, supra note 6.
206 Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1934 (2003).
207 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 89 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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declared in Trop v. Dulles208: “The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man.”209 In Trop, the Chief Justice “relied heavily on
international sources to interpret the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause.”210 A few years later, the Court announced that the “overriding function
of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the State.”211 Since then, the Court has invoked the term “dignity”
in relation to “the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights to be free from discrim-
ination, and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to make one’s own decisions
on procreation.”212 Professors Resnik and Suk conclude: “[D]ignity talk in the law of
the United States is an example of how U.S. law is influenced by the norms of other
nations, by transnational experiences, and by international legal documents.”213
Closely related to dignity is the right to privacy. UDHR Article 12 explicitly rec-
ognizes a right to privacy.214 However, the term “privacy” does not appear in the U.S.
Constitution. Thus, the Supreme Court declared in 1922: “[N]either the Fourteenth
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the United States . . . con-
fer[s] any right of privacy upon either persons or corporations.”215 A few years later,
in Olmstead v. United States,216 Justice Brandeis wrote in dissent that the Constitution
should be construed to protect “the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”217 Two decades after Olmstead, the
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado218: “The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary in-
trusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a
free society. It is therefore . . . enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause.”219 Later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,220 the Court found a right to privacy in
the “penumbras” of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.221 Since
Griswold, the right to privacy has been at the heart of the Court’s substantive due
process jurisprudence.222
208 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
209 Id. at 100.
210 Melissa A. Waters, International Law as an Interpretive Tool in the Supreme Court,
1946–2000, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
380, 410 (Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge eds., 2011).
211 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
212 Resnik & Suk, supra note 206, at 1935.
213 Id. at 1926.
214 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with
his privacy . . .”).
215 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
216 227 U.S. 438 (1928). 
217 Id. at 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
218 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
219 Id. at 27–28.
220 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
221 Id. at 484–85.
222 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
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Aside from dignity and privacy, other unenumerated rights that the Court recog-
nized are more specific. UDHR Article 2 bars discrimination based on “birth.”223
Before the human rights revolution, many state laws discriminated against “illegiti-
mate” children.224 However, in a series of decisions between 1968 and 1972, the Court
ruled that the Equal Protection Clause constrains the power of states to discriminate
against children born out of wedlock.225 UDHR Article 16 states: “Men and women of
full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to
marry.”226 Until the 1960s, many states banned interracial marriage, but the Supreme
Court held in Loving v. Virginia227 that state laws prohibiting interracial marriage vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment.228 UDHR Article 20 recognizes a right to freedom
of association.229 The Constitution does not explicitly guarantee freedom of associa-
tion, but the Court held in National Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v.
Alabama230 that a court order requiring “disclosure of membership in an organiza-
tion engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs” violated the members’ rights to free-
dom of association under the Fourteenth Amendment.231
UDHR Article 11(1) states: “Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty.”232 The presumption of innocence has
been a central feature of criminal law in every state since the Founding.233 However,
the Supreme Court did not establish federal constitutional protection for that pre-
sumption until 1970.234 The Court held in In re Winship235 that the Due Process Clause
mandates proof beyond a reasonable doubt because the reasonable doubt “standard
provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock ‘axiom-
atic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the ad-
ministration of our criminal law.’”236
Article 11(1) provides that criminal defendants are entitled to “all the guarantees
necessary” for their defense.237 As explained above, we identify eight distinct rights
encompassed within this phrase. Three of those rights are relevant here. First, ICCPR
223 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 2.
224 See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Glona v. Am.
Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
225 See sources cited supra note 224.
226 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 16.
227 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
228 Id.
229 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 20.
230 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
231 Id. at 462.
232 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 11(1).
233 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
234 Id.
235 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
236 Id. at 363.
237 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 11.
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Article 14(5) protects the right to appeal a criminal conviction.238 The Constitution
does not explicitly guarantee criminal defendants a right of appeal, but Griffin v.
Illinois239 established federal constitutional protection for the right to appeal state
criminal convictions.240 Second, ICCPR Article 14(3)(d) requires states to provide an
attorney at no cost for an indigent criminal defendant.241 The Sixth Amendment guar-
antees “Assistance of Counsel,” but it does not explicitly require the state to provide
counsel free of charge.242 Nevertheless, Gideon v. Wainwright243 held that states have
a constitutional duty, absent a valid waiver of the right, to provide appointed counsel
free of charge for indigent criminal defendants.244
Third, ICCPR Article 14(3)(f) protects the right of criminal defendants to the
assistance of an interpreter.245 The Constitution does not include any comparable
provision. The Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether the Constitution
guarantees a right to an interpreter. As of 1976, both the First and Second Circuits
had held that the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to an interpreter
in some cases.246 At least three other circuits recognized this right in the 1980s and
1990s.247 No federal appellate court has held to the contrary.248 Therefore, although the
matter is not free from doubt, we classify the right to an interpreter as an unenumer-
ated constitutional right established by federal judicial decisions.
In sum, judicial decisions between 1948 and 1976 established federal constitu-
tional protection for nine distinct unenumerated rights. All nine were subject to ex-
clusive state regulatory authority before 1948. Seven of the nine rights—the right to
be treated with dignity, the right to privacy, the presumption of innocence, the right
to appeal, the right to state-appointed counsel, the right to freedom of association, and
the prohibition on discriminating against illegitimate children—have been subject to
federal primacy since 1976 as a result of the Supreme Court’s constitutional juris-
prudence. In contrast, despite the Court’s landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia, we
classify the right to marry as state primacy, due to traditional state control over fam-
ily law matters. Finally, we also classify the right to an interpreter as state primacy.
238 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 14(5).
239 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
240 See id. (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes states from charging a fee
to an indigent defendant to obtain the transcript needed to appeal his conviction).
241 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 14(3)(d).
242 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
243 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
244 Id. at 344–45.
245 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 14(3)(f).
246 See United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973); U.S. ex rel. Negron v.
New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389–90 (2d Cir. 1970).
247 See United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1179–81 (9th Cir. 1994); Valladeres v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d
620, 634 (7th Cir. 1985).
248 See United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2001) (reviewing cases).
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Federal rules govern the right to an interpreter in federal court,249 but federal courts
exercise fairly weak supervision over the right to an interpreter in state court.
3. Federalization by Statute
The previous sections focused on courts, however, Congress also contributed
to the federalization of human rights between 1948 and 1976. UDHR Article 25(1)
declares a “right to security in the event of . . . disability.”250 The Social Security
Amendments Act of 1956 created the first federal program for disability benefits.251
The Social Security Act of 1935 created federal old-age benefits, but it did not pro-
vide benefits for people who become disabled before reaching retirement age.252 State
workmen’s compensation laws provided disability benefits, but state programs varied
widely.253 The federal government provided disability benefits for federal employees
before 1956, but those programs were quite limited in scope.254 The 1956 statute estab-
lished a broad class of individuals who are “entitled to a disability insurance benefit”
under federal law.255
UDHR Article 2 prohibits discrimination based on “religion” and “national or so-
cial origin.”256 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars discrimination based on both religion
and national origin in the context of public accommodations257 and employment.258
The Act also bars discrimination based on national origin, but not religion, in the
context of federally assisted programs.259 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 also barred
discrimination based on race and color in the context of public accommodations,260
but the Supreme Court declared that law unconstitutional in 1883.261 In contrast, the
Court upheld the validity of the public accommodations provisions in the 1964 Civil
249 See An Act to Provide More Effectively for the Use of Interpreters in Courts of the
United States, Pub. L. No. 95-539, 92 Stat. 2040 (1978).
250 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 25(1).
251 Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 103, 70 Stat. 815 (1956).
252 See Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620, 620–25 (1935).
253 SOCIAL SECURITY OFFICE OF POLICY, SOC. SEC. BULL., Vol. 65, No. 4, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION: A BACKGROUND FOR SOCIAL SECURITY PROFESSIONALS (2003/2004),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n4/v65n4p7.html [https://perma.cc/5H37-MN98].
254 See Social Security Amendments of 1955: Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 84th
Cong. 51–55 (Memorandum on Disability Provisions of Retirement Systems for Federal
Civilian Employees).
255 Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 103, 70 Stat. 815 (1956).
256 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 2.
257 Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(a), 78 Stat. 243 (1964).
258 Id. §§ 703(a–d), 78 Stat. 255–56.
259 See id. § 601, 78 Stat. 252. The 1964 Act also prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, and sex. We discuss those issues below. See infra notes 303–21 and accompanying text.
260 An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and Legal Rights, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (Mar. 1,
1875).
261 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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Rights Act shortly after its enactment.262 Thus, the 1964 Act established federal leg-
islative control over discrimination by private actors throughout the country.
The 1965 Voting Rights Act also enhanced federal power over human rights.263
UDHR Article 2 prohibits discrimination based on language. Section 4(e) of the Vot-
ing Rights Act addressed the rights “of persons educated in American-flag schools
in which the predominant classroom language was other than English.”264 The Act pro-
hibits “States from conditioning the right to vote of such persons on ability to read,
write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language.”265 Section 4(e)
was intended, at least in part, to secure the rights of New York City’s Puerto Rican
community.266 In Katzenbach v. Morgan,267 voters challenged the constitutionality
of section 4(e), contending that it interfered with the state’s constitutional power to
determine the appropriate qualifications for New York voters.268 The plaintiffs had
a strong argument: the Supreme Court had recently ruled that state laws conditioning
the right to vote on an English language literacy test were constitutional.269 Neverthe-
less, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 4(e), reasoning that section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enact legislation to displace
state laws that would otherwise be constitutional.270 Although federal law does not bar
discrimination based on language in other contexts, the Voting Rights Act provides
federal protection for the right to be free from discrimination based on language when
exercising the right to vote.271
UDHR Article 23(1) states: “Everyone has the right . . . to just and favourable
conditions of work.”272 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 created federal rules
related to minimum wages and maximum working hours.273 However, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970274 was the first federal statute creating signifi-
cant federal protection for the Article 23 right to “just and favourable conditions of
work.”275 Congress specifically found “that personal injuries and illnesses arising out
262 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1964).
263 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (Aug. 6, 1965).
264 § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
265 Id.
266 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966); ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at
116–21.
267 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
268 Id.
269 Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
270 Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 649–58.
271 The right to an interpreter, discussed previously, is also relevant to discrimination based
on language.
272 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 23(1).
273 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
274 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
275 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 23.
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of work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate
commerce.”276 Thus, the Act’s purpose was “to assure so far as possible every work-
ing man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.”277 Before
enactment of the 1970 legislation, state laws varied widely in the type and quality of
regulations protecting worker health and safety.278 Moreover, prior federal laws on
occupational safety applied “only to workers performing Government contracts and
then only for the period of time they are actually working on these contracts.”279
UDHR Article 25(1) recognizes a right to “medical care.”280 Title V of the Social
Security Act of 1935 included provisions on medical care for mothers and children.281
However, federal law did not provide significant protection for the right to medical
care until Congress enacted the Social Security Amendments Act of 1965.282 The 1965
amendments created the modern Medicare and Medicaid programs.283 The legislation
added a new Title XVIII to the Social Security Act, which created a federal entitlement
to hospital insurance benefits for Americans aged 65 or older (Medicare).284 The 1965
amendments also added a new Title XIX (Medicaid), which expanded both federal
support and federal oversight for state programs for individuals “whose income and
resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.”285 Federal
regulation of the right to medical care continued to expand after 1965,286 but the 1965
amendments established federal primacy over the right to medical care.
UDHR Article 26 recognizes a right to free education “in the elementary and
fundamental stages,” as well as a right of equal access to “higher education . . . on
the basis of merit.”287 Congress provided federal protection for the right of equal
access to higher education in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.288
Section 901(a) states: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
276 § 2, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
277 § 2(b), 84 Stat. 1590.
278 See A Review of State Occupational Health Legislation: Hearing Before the Select
Subcomm. on Labor, 91st Cong. 74–110 (1969).
279 Occupational Safety and Health: Hearing on H.R. 14816 and H.R. 15571 Before the
Select Subcomm. on Labor, 90th Cong. (1968) (Statement of Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor).
280 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 25.
281 Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620, 629–33 (Aug. 14, 1935).
282 Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (July 30, 1965).
283 See id.
284 See id. § 226, 79 Stat. 290–91; id. §§ 1811–1812, 79 Stat. 291–92; S. Rep. No. 89-213,
at 4–6 (1965).
285 See Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1901–05, 79 Stat. 286, 343–53; see also S. Rep. No. 89-213,
at 9–10 (1965).
286 See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE & MEDICAID MILE-
STONES: 1937–2015, https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/Down
loads/Medicare-and-Medicaid-Milestones-1937-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3ET-LRUW].
287 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 26.
288 Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (June 23, 1972).
2019] UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 1227
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under” any federally funded program of higher education.289 Congress pro-
vided federal protection for the right to free elementary education in the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.290 When it adopted the statute, Congress
made explicit findings that “more than half of the handicapped children in the United
States do not receive appropriate educational services,” and that “one million of the
handicapped children in the United States are excluded entirely from the public school
system.”291 The primary purpose of the act was “to assure that all handicapped chil-
dren have available to them . . . a free appropriate public education.”292 The statute
appropriated federal funds and created federal rules providing legal protection for the
Article 26 right to free elementary education.293
UDHR Article 25(1) states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living ade-
quate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.”294 The right to an
adequate standard of living is an amalgam of several component rights, including the
rights to food, housing, and medical care, as well as rights to government financial
support in the event of unemployment, disability, and old age.295 We have discussed
most of these component rights previously. Congress provided federal financial sup-
port for the elderly and unemployed in the Social Security Act of 1935.296 Congress
created federal statutory protection for a right to housing in 1937297 and for a right to
medical care in 1965.298 It provided federal financial support for people with disabili-
ties in the 1956 Amendments to the Social Security Act.299 The right to food is the
only remaining component right that we have not discussed previously.300 Congress
established federal statutory protection for the right to food in the Food Stamp Act of
1964.301 The right to an adequate standard of living was subject to exclusive state regu-
lation before 1930. Reasonable people could disagree about the proper classification
of the right after 1930. We classify it as “concurrent authority with state primacy” as
of 1948, based on the 1935 Social Security Act and the 1937 Housing Act. We classify
289 86 Stat. at 373. The statute includes various exclusions and limitations. See 86 Stat. at
373–75. Even so, it does provide significant federal protection for the right of equal access
to higher education. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
290 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (Nov. 29, 1975).
291 Id. § 3(a), 89 Stat. 774.
292 Id. § 3(c), 89 Stat. 775 (emphasis added).
293 See id.
294 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 25(1).
295 See id.
296 See supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.
297 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 280–86 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text.
300 We do not include the right to food as a distinct right in our list of sixty-eight rights be-
cause the CCP database does not identify it as a separate right. See Elkins et al., supra note 14.
301 Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (Aug. 31, 1964).
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it as “federal primacy” as of 1976, based on federal disability benefits created in 1956,
the Food Stamp Act of 1964, and the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs en-
acted in 1965.
Setting aside the right to an adequate standard of living, seven of the other eight
rights examined in this section were subject to exclusive state regulatory authority
before 1948: non-discrimination based on language, non-discrimination based on reli-
gion, the right to free elementary education, the right of equal access to higher educa-
tion, the right to medical care, the right to just and favorable working conditions, and
the right to financial support in case of disability. The one exception is the right to non-
discrimination based on national origin. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, the
United States entered into a series of bilateral treaties that restricted the power of state
governments to discriminate on the basis of national origin.302 Hence, before 1948,
that right was subject to concurrent authority, with state primacy. Civil rights legisla-
tion enacted in the 1960s augmented federal control. Therefore, as of 1976, the right
to non-discrimination based on national origin was subject to federal primacy.
The seven other rights addressed in this section can be divided into two catego-
ries. After 1948, the right to free elementary education, the right of equal access to
higher education, and the right to non-discrimination based on language shifted from
“exclusive state control” to “state primacy.” Federal control over those rights remains
relatively weak. In contrast, the right to non-discrimination based on religion, the
right to medical care, the right to just and favorable working conditions, and the right
to financial support in case of disability shifted from “exclusive state control” to
“federal primacy.” The federal statutes referenced above establish fairly robust fed-
eral control over those rights.
4. Complex Federalization Processes
The other seven rights that were federalized between 1948 and 1976 do not fit
neatly into any of the previous groups—incorporation, unenumerated rights, or fed-
eralization by statute—because federalization involved a mix of different processes.
UDHR Article 2 prohibits discrimination based on both “race” and “colour.”303 We
count non-discrimination based on race and color as two separate rights. The Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause protects both rights.304 Nevertheless, as of
1948, we classify both rights as “state primacy” because states had broad latitude to dis-
criminate based on race and color, as evidenced by pervasive Jim Crow laws through-
out the South. The Supreme Court decisions in Brown v. Board of Education305 and
302 See John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern
Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANS’L L. 302, 306–16 (2013).
303 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 2.
304 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
305 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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its progeny, followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,306 the Voting Rights Act of
1965,307 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968,308 solidified robust federal control over
those rights. Hence, by 1976, both rights were subject to federal primacy.
UDHR Article 3 protects “the right to life.”309 Under international human rights
law, the right to life is inextricably linked to the death penalty. Both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses preclude deprivation of life “without
due process of law.”310 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments imposed some limi-
tations on capital punishment before 1948, but state law predominated in this area
until the 1970s.311 The 1972 Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia312 was
a key turning point. The Court in Furman, in a deeply divided opinion, temporarily
halted capital punishment in the United States, holding that “the imposition and carry-
ing out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”313 Justice Brennan’s concurring
opinion characterized the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as a “basic guaranty
of human rights.”314 Furman and its progeny established robust federal protection for
the right to life.315 Accordingly, we classify the right to life as “federal primacy” as
of 1976.
UDHR Article 2 prohibits gender-based discrimination. The Nineteenth Amend-
ment, ratified in 1920, provides that the right “to vote shall not be denied or
abridged . . . on account of sex.”316 As of 1948, though, the Nineteenth Amendment
was the only significant federal law prohibiting gender discrimination. Since federal
regulation did not address matters other than voting rights, we classify this right as
“state primacy” as of 1948. Between 1948 and 1976, though, Congress and the
Supreme Court joined forces to provide robust federal rules barring gender discrimi-
nation. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act made it unlawful for an employer “to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s” sex.317 Similarly,
Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments states: “No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
306 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (July 2, 1964).
307 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (Aug. 6, 1965).
308 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (Apr. 11, 1968).
309 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 3.
310 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV.
311 See generally STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2003).
312 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
313 Id. at 239–40.
314 Id. at 268 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also id. at 320 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting
a statement from Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratifying Convention to the effect that a Bill of
Rights was necessary to protect “human rights”).
315 See VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY IN A NUTSHELL (2013).
316 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
317 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (July 2, 1964).
1230 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1183
or be subjected to discrimination under” any federally funded program of higher edu-
cation.318 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court decided in Reed v. Reed319 and Frontiero
v. Richardson320 that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause provides
additional protection from gender-based discrimination.321 Thus, as of 1976, the pro-
hibition on gender-based discrimination was subject to federal primacy.
UDHR Article 2 also prohibits discrimination based on property ownership.322 The
Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed all citizens the same right “as is enjoyed by
white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.”323 Even so, this right was subject to state primacy as of 1948 because fed-
eral rules barring discrimination based on property were fairly weak at that time. By
1976, though, the balance between state and federal regulation had changed signifi-
cantly. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, provided that the right to
vote “shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of
failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”324 The Supreme Court held in Griffin v.
Illinois that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes states from charging a fee to an
indigent defendant to obtain the transcript needed to appeal his conviction.325 A few
years later, the Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright that states have a constitutional
duty to provide appointed counsel free of charge for indigent criminal defendants.326
Granted, the Court held in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez327 that
poverty is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.328 However,
Justice Powell’s opinion in Rodriguez distinguished a series of cases in which the
Court had previously held that the Constitution provides special protection for impov-
erished people in particular contexts.329 Moreover, the federal statutes establishing fed-
eral primacy over the right to an adequate standard of living, discussed previously,330
are also highly relevant to discrimination based on property. Thus, although poverty
is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause, by 1976, the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment and a series of federal statutes and Supreme Court decisions had
318 Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (June 23, 1972).
319 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
320 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
321 Id. at 690–91; Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
322 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 2.
323 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1866).
324 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
325 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
326 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
327 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
328 Id.
329 See id. at 20–22 (citing, inter alia, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); and Tate v. Short, 401
U.S. 395 (1971)); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (holding that state
courts cannot require an indigent welfare recipient to pay court fees to file a divorce action).
330 See supra notes 294–301 and accompanying text.
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established federal primacy over the right to be free from discrimination based on
property ownership.
UDHR Article 8 states: “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the constitution or by law.”331 Two federal statutes enacted shortly after the Civil
War are especially important for the Article 8 right to a remedy. The Reconstruction
Act of 1867 authorized federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief to state prisoners
detained in violation of federal law.332 Although the statute existed on paper for de-
cades, state prisoners had little practical success obtaining federal habeas relief be-
fore World War II.333 The Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen334 was
a key turning point. Brown adopted an expansive interpretation of the federal habeas
statute, holding that state prisoners could relitigate any constitutional claims in a fed-
eral habeas petition.335 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.336 Section 1983 authorizes individuals to file civil suits in federal court
to obtain remedies for violations by state and local officers of federally protected
rights.337 Like the federal habeas statute, before World War II Section 1983 did very
little practical work to make federal remedies available to civil plaintiffs.338 The
Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape339 effectively opened the flood-
gates to federal civil rights claims under Section 1983. Since 1961, the federal habeas
statute and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have been the two most important remedial mechanisms
that implement the Article 8 right to a remedy as a matter of federal law. In light of the
above, we classify the right to a remedy as “state primacy” until 1948 and “federal
primacy” as of 1976.
UDHR Article 21(3) proclaims a right to “universal and equal suffrage.”340 The
road to universal suffrage in the United States has been long and rocky. Key constitu-
tional amendments include: the Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, which gave
blacks the right to vote;341 the Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, which gave
women the right to vote;342 the Twenty-Third Amendment, ratified in 1961, which
gave residents of the District of Columbia the right to vote;343 the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment, ratified in 1964, which abolished poll taxes;344 and the Twenty-Sixth
331 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 8.
332 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255).
333 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 930–33 (2012).
334 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
335 Id. at 460–65.
336 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
337 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 333, at 497–500.
338 See id. at 505–06.
339 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
340 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 21(3).
341 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
342 Id. amend. XIX.
343 Id. amend. XXIII.
344 Id. amend. XXIV.
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Amendment, ratified in 1971, which gave eighteen-year-olds the right to vote.345 As
a practical matter, though, the 1965 Voting Rights Act346 and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Reynolds v. Sims347 provided more robust federal protection for voting
rights than the various constitutional amendments.348 Given widespread restrictions
on voting rights throughout the South during the Jim Crow era,349 we classify the
right to vote as “state primacy” as of 1948. However, the combination of constitu-
tional amendments, federal statutes and Supreme Court decisions meant the right to
vote was subject to federal primacy by 1976.
D. Comparing Civil/Political Rights to Economic/Social Rights
We noted previously that the constitutional revolution establishing the New Deal/
Great Society constitutional regime was a human rights revolution. International human
rights law distinguishes between civil/political rights and economic/social rights. Be-
tween 1930 and 1976, the federal government substantially expanded its control over
both civil/political rights and economic/social rights. Figures 10 and 11 depict the
transfer of authority from the states to the federal government for both sets of rights
between 1930 and 1976.
Figure 10
345 Id. amend. XXVI.
346 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (Aug. 6, 1965).
347 377 U.S. 533, 534, 558 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause restricts
gerrymandering and establishes a “one person, one vote” rule).
348 See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 158–65.
349 See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
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Figure 11
The sixty-eight rights in our data set include forty-eight rights in the civil/political
category; those rights correspond to Articles 1 to 21 of the UDHR. The data set also
includes twenty rights in the economic/social category; those rights correspond to
Articles 22 to 27 of the UDHR. As of 1930, eighty-three percent of the civil/political
rights were subject to exclusive or primary state control. By 1976, though, eighty-one
percent of the civil/political rights were subject to exclusive or primary federal control.
Compare those figures to the corresponding figures for economic/social rights. As of
1930, ninety-five percent of the economic/social rights (19 out of 20) were subject to
exclusive state regulatory authority.350 (Interestingly, as of 1930, none of the economic/
social rights in our data set were subject to concurrent federal/state authority.) By 1976,
fifty-five percent of the economic/social rights were subject to exclusive or primary
federal control. Thus, in the modern era, the federal government undoubtedly exercises
greater control over civil/political rights than it does over economic/social rights.
Even so, the “baseline” distribution of power in 1930 for economic/social rights
weighed more heavily in favor of state control than it did for civil/political rights. As
of 1930, states exercised exclusive regulatory authority over ninety-five percent of
economic/social rights and thirty-five percent of civil/political rights. In comparison,
as of 1976, states exercised exclusive regulatory authority over just thirty percent of
economic/social rights and six percent of civil/political rights. In sum, there are
various ways to quantify the transfer of regulatory authority from the states to the
350 The one exception involves intellectual property rights, which are subject to exclusive
federal control in the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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federal government between 1930 and 1976. By some measures, though, the federal-
ization of economic/social rights was even more dramatic than the federalization of
civil/political rights because the states exercised virtually complete control over eco-
nomic/social rights before the New Deal revolution.
E. Maintenance of the Status Quo Since 1976
The Rehnquist Court launched a federalism revolution with its landmark decisions
in New York v. United States,351 United States v. Lopez,352 Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida,353 City of Boerne v. Flores,354 and United States v. Morrison.355 Collectively,
these and related cases imposed significant new federalism limits on Congress’s leg-
islative powers. Nevertheless, two decades after the Rehnquist Court’s federalism
revolution, the division of power over human rights between the states and the fed-
eral government is roughly the same as in 1976. As of 1976, the sixty-eight rights in
our data set included three rights classified as EF, forty-seven rights classified as FP,
nine rights classified as SP, and nine rights classified as ES.356 With one exception,
those same classifications still apply in 2018.
The one exception involves the right to asylum under UDHR Article 14. That
right was subject to exclusive federal control throughout the period from 1930 to
1976. Due to recent developments in immigration federalism, the right to asylum is
now subject to concurrent state authority, with federal primacy.357 In Arizona v. United
States,358 the Supreme Court affirmed federal primacy over immigration law, but gave
states leeway to enact their own immigration regulations.359 Recently, several state and
local governments have adopted sanctuary laws designed to protect the Article 14
right to asylum.360 President Trump issued an executive order that purports to deny
federal funding to local governments enacting such sanctuary laws.361 In response,
several local governments filed lawsuits challenging that executive order.362 As of this
writing, the lower federal courts have uniformly ruled in favor of local governments
in the “sanctuary city” cases.363
351 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
352 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
353 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
354 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
355 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
356 See Figure 9 and Tables 3, 4, & 5.
357 See PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMI-
GRATION FEDERALISM 3–8 (2015).
358 567 U.S. 387, 400–03, 408–10 (2012).
359 Id.
360 See, e.g., California Values Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7284–7284.12 (West 2017) (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 2018).
361 Exec. Order No. 13768, § 9(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
362 See, e.g., City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1225 (9th Cir. 2018).
363 See id.; City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018); City of Los Angeles
v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2018); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F.
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It would be tedious to review the current status of all sixty-eight rights in our data
set. A few examples suffice. First, the data set includes sixteen rights in the Bill of
Rights federalized by Supreme Court incorporation decisions.364 The Court has not
reversed any of those decisions. To the contrary, it extended the federalization of the
Bill of Rights in McDonald v. City of Chicago,365 holding that the Second Amendment
binds state and local governments.366 More recently, the Court doubled down on feder-
alization by incorporation, holding in Timbs v. Indiana367 that the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause is binding on the states.368Thus, all sixteen rights in the data
set that are included in the Bill of Rights remain subject to federal primacy today.
The data set includes eleven rights federalized by Supreme Court decisions es-
tablishing constitutional protection for unenumerated rights.369 The Court has not
reversed any of those decisions. In fact, the Court has augmented protection for sev-
eral of those rights. For example, in Obergefell v. Hodges,370 the Court built on the
foundation of Loving v. Virginia371 to extend federal constitutional protection for the
right to marry to same sex couples.372
The data set includes sixteen rights federalized primarily via Congressional leg-
islation.373 All of the statutes establishing federal legislative protection for human
rights discussed previously in this Article remain in force today, with one exception.
In Shelby County v. Holder,374 the Supreme Court invalidated the “preclearance” re-
quirement in section 4 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Notwithstanding the decision
in Shelby County, the right to universal suffrage in Article 21 of the UDHR remains
subject to federal primacy today, as it was in 1976. One other recent Supreme Court de-
cision is noteworthy in this context. In National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius,375 the Court addressed constitutional challenges to the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) (known as “Obamacare”).376 Congress federal-
ized the right to medical care when it enacted the Social Security Amendments Act of
Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa 2017); County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D.
Cal. 2017); City of Seattle v. Trump, 2017 WL 4700144 (W.D. Wash. 2017). But see City
of El Cenizo, Texas v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018) (upholding validity of Texas state
law that effectively preempted sanctuary city laws enacted by several cities and counties in
Texas).
364 See Tables 3, 4, & 5 for details.
365 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
366 Id. at 791.
367 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
368 Id.
369 See Tables 4 & 5 for details.
370 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
371 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
372 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
373 See Tables 2 & 3 for details.
374 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
375 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
376 Id.
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1965, which created the modern Medicare and Medicaid programs.377 The PPACA
expanded federal protection for the right to medical care beyond the scope of prior
federal legislation.378 In Sebelius, the Court upheld the PPACA’s individual mandate
provision as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power.379 However, the Court inval-
idated a different provision of the PPACA that authorized the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to penalize states that opt out of the Medicaid expansion program.380
Sebelius, Shelby County, and other cases suggest that the Court may limit further
expansion of federal statutory regulation of human rights. However, the Court has
shown little inclination to reverse the federalization of human rights that resulted from
enactment of federal human rights statutes between 1930 and 1976.
IV. FEDERALIZATION AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Part IV contends that the diffusion of human rights as a global political morality
was an important factor contributing to the federalization of human rights law in the
United States between 1948 and 1976. We do not claim that the global diffusion of
human rights norms was the only factor, or even the most important factor, that led to
federalization of human rights. We claim only that it was one significant causal factor
that has been underappreciated in prior scholarly accounts of the civil rights revolution.
A simple search on Westlaw provides support for this thesis. We searched for
the term “human rights” in U.S. Supreme Court opinions in three different time
periods. That search yielded only eight cases before 1930, just nine cases between
1930 and 1947, and a total of seventy-eight Supreme Court decisions between 1948
and 1976 that use the term “human rights.” Ten of those cases played a significant
role in the federalization of human rights law: Skinner v. Oklahoma,381 Adamson v.
California,382 Oyama v. California,383 Wolf v. Colorado,384 Monroe v. Pape,385 Gideon
377 See supra notes 280–86 and accompanying text.
378 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (Mar. 23, 2010).
379 See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 561–74.
380 See id. at 575–85.
381 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (“This case touches a sensitive and important area of human
rights.”). See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text (discussing Skinner).
382 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring to previous Supreme
Court Justices “whose services in the cause of human rights and the spirit of freedom are the
most conspicuous in our history.”). See infra Section IV.C (discussing Adamson).
383 332 U.S. 633, 649–50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring) (“we have recently pledged our-
selves to cooperate with the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion”); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring) (similar). See infra Section IV.B
(discussing Oyama).
384 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (stating that a search “without authority of law but solely on
the authority of the police . . . [is] inconsistent with the conception of human rights . . . ”).
See supra notes 187, 204, 218 and accompanying text and infra note 507 (discussing Wolf).
385 365 U.S. 167, 244 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part) (“It is very queer to try
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v. Wainwright,386 Reynolds v. Sims,387 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,388
Duncan v. Louisiana,389 and Furman v. Georgia.390 As Professor Primus has noted,
the increased use of the term “human rights” after World War II “represented the rise
of a new concept, a new set of substantive commitments.”391
Scholars have developed different theories to explain how international human
rights norms influence the development of rights-protecting laws and practices within
domestic legal systems. Professors Goodman and Jinks posit a process of “accultura-
tion.”392 Professor Linos writes about “policy diffusion.”393 Professor Koh refers to
“transnational legal process.”394 Professors Keck and Sikkink describe “transnational
advocacy networks.”395 From our perspective, the similarities among these theories
are more important than the differences: they all maintain that global norms influ-
ence domestic legal change, whether through legislation, judicial interpretation or
constitutional amendment. We do not offer a novel theory about the mechanics of that
process. Instead, we contend that—regardless of what terminology is used to describe
transnational norm diffusion—that process helps explain the federalization of human
rights law in the United States. Several leading scholarly accounts of constitutional
change in the United States after World War II adopt an insular perspective that largely
ignores global human rights developments.396 In contrast, we offer a transnational
to protect human rights in the middle of the Twentieth Century by a left-over from the days
of General Grant.”). See supra note 339 and accompanying text (discussing Monroe v. Pape).
386 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (stating that the right to counsel “is one of the safeguards of
the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty”). See supra notes 204, 243, 326 and accompanying text; infra Section IV.C (dis-
cussing Gideon).
387 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (“[this] case touches a sensitive and important area of human
rights”). See supra notes 347–48 and accompanying text (discussing Reynolds).
388 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). See supra note 262 and accom-
panying text (discussing Heart of Atlanta Motel).
389 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) (“Congress, state courts, and state
legislatures have moved forward with the advancing conception of human rights in according
procedural as well as substantive rights to individuals accused of” crimes). See supra 178 and
accompanying text; infra Section IV.C (discussing Duncan).
390 408 U.S. 238, 268 (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause as a “basic guaranty of human rights”). See supra notes 312–15 and accom-
panying text (discussing Furman).
391 PRIMUS, supra note 3, at 191.
392 RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 38–52 (2013).
393 LINOS, supra note 5, at 13–35.
394 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2602 (1997).
395 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 (1998).
396 See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 1; JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM
(2011); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
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perspective that, we believe, provides a richer understanding of the factors that influ-
enced constitutional change in the United States between 1948 and 1976.
In the decades after World War II, the United States presented itself as the leader
of the free world. A core message of U.S. foreign policy was explicitly moralistic:
our capitalist, democratic system is morally superior to the alternatives.397 However,
persistent human rights violations at home undermined the effort to sell the virtues
of American democracy to a skeptical global audience. For other countries to accept
the United States as leader of the free world, the United States needed to exercise
moral leadership by enhancing domestic protection for human rights. Equality, uni-
versality, and inalienability are central principles of the morality of human rights.
As a practical matter, the United States could not fully realize these principles within
the traditional system of constitutional federalism, which granted states primary re-
sponsibility for protection of human rights. By appropriating greater control over
human rights, the federal government reinforced the nation’s claim to moral leader-
ship of the free world.398
Part IV is divided into four sections. The first section addresses the relationship
between international diplomacy and domestic human rights violations. We show that
the United States was especially vulnerable to diplomatic pressure for human rights
reform, due to the jarring contrast between its claim of moral leadership and the reality
of legally sanctioned racial segregation. The next section focuses on Supreme Court
decisions between 1948 and 1954 in which advocates cited the UDHR and/or the UN
Charter’s human rights provisions in Supreme Court briefs. We contend that frequent
invocation of international human rights norms by domestic litigants helped persuade
the Court to reinterpret the Equal Protection Clause to strengthen constitutional anti-
discrimination norms. The third section focuses on the “incorporation debate” in the
Supreme Court from 1947 to 1971. We show that the diffusion of human rights norms
as a global political morality helps explain the incorporation cases. The final section
responds to potential objections to our claim that the global diffusion of human rights
norms contributed to the federalization of human rights in the United States.
A. Human Rights and International Diplomacy
The United Nations Charter entered into force in 1945. Articles 55 and 56 obligate
states “to take joint and separate action” to promote “human rights . . . for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”399 Soon after the Charter took ef-
fect, the General Assembly created the Commission on Human Rights to implement
the organization’s human rights mandate.400 The Commission drafted the Universal
397 See, e.g., David P. Forsythe, US Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Situating Obama,
3 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 767, 773–74 (2011).
398 See generally DUDZIAK, supra note 2.
399 U.N. Charter arts. 55(c), 56 (emphasis added).
400 U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/259
(27 Jan.–10 Feb. 1947).
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Declaration, which established the prohibition against discrimination on the basis
of “race, colour, sex [or] national or social origin”401 as a central norm of the then-
emerging international human rights regime. In light of that norm, the continued prac-
tice of racial segregation posed a substantial obstacle to the United States’ diplomatic
effort to promote itself as leader of the free world.402
In December 1946, President Truman established the President’s Committee on
Civil Rights, directing the Committee to develop recommendations for measures to
promote “more adequate and effective means and procedures for the protection of
the civil rights of the people of the United States.”403 The Committee delivered its
report the next year. The report identified “a moral reason . . . and an international
reason for believing that the time” was ripe for taking affirmative steps to end racial
discrimination in the United States.404 The moral reason related to the shocking “dif-
ference between what we preach about civil rights and what we practice . . . .”405
The Committee explained the international reason for civil rights reform: “Our
foreign policy is designed to make the United States an enormous, positive influence
for peace and progress throughout the world. . . . But our domestic civil rights short-
comings are a serious obstacle [ ]” to accomplishment of those foreign policy objec-
tives.406 The Committee continued:
We cannot escape the fact that our civil rights record has been
an issue in world politics. The world’s press and radio are full of
it. . . . We and our friends have been, and are, stressing our
achievements. Those with competing philosophies . . . have tried
to prove our democracy an empty fraud, and our nation a consis-
tent oppressor of underprivileged people.407
The Committee added:
[O]ur civil rights record has growing international implications. . . .
The subject of human rights, itself, has been made a major con-
cern of the United Nations. . . . A lynching in a rural American
community is not a challenge to that community’s conscience
alone. The repercussions of such a crime are heard not only in
the locality, or indeed only in our own nation. They echo from one
end of the globe to the other . . . . Similarly, interference with the
401 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 2.
402 The analysis in this section borrows liberally from SLOSS, supra note 36, at 183–85.
403 THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RTS., REP., TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, at vii (1947).
404 Id. at 139.
405 Id. at 139–40.
406 Id. at 146.
407 Id. at 147.
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right of a qualified citizen to vote locally cannot today remain a
local problem. An American diplomat cannot forcefully argue for
free elections in foreign lands without meeting the challenge that
in many sections of America qualified voters do not have free
access to the polls.408
In sum, by establishing human rights promotion as a primary goal of the United
Nations, the nations of the world had determined that lynching and free elections
would henceforth be matters of international concern. Race discrimination in the
United States was a foreign policy issue because the international community made
it a foreign policy issue.
Racial discrimination—including lynching, Jim Crow laws, and restrictions on
political participation by African Americans—was a reality in the United States from
the end of Reconstruction until World War II.409 During that period, the “difference
between what we preach about civil rights and what we practice,” in the Committee’s
words, was as wide as the gap that existed after World War II.410 Nevertheless, in the
early twentieth century, racial discrimination was generally not a subject of interna-
tional diplomacy. Adoption of the UN Charter and the UDHR signaled a change in the
conduct of international diplomacy by creating a new norm that effectively interna-
tionalized the problem of “domestic” human rights violations. This helps explain why
racial discrimination in the United States became a subject of intense media interest
throughout the world in the late 1940s,411 even though foreign media generally ignored
the problem previously.
We do not claim that the Charter itself caused a change in the conduct of interna-
tional diplomacy. Rather, the decision to include human rights provisions in the UN
Charter, and to adopt the Genocide Convention and the UDHR, manifested a changed
attitude about “domestic” human rights violations. Before World War II, diplomats
typically did not criticize other countries for the treatment of their own racial minor-
ities, unless the complaining country shared a national, ethnic, or religious affiliation
with the persecuted minority. Widely accepted principles of international law dictated
that a country’s treatment of its own citizens was a purely domestic matter.412 Thus,
before World War II, if an Asian or European state criticized the United States for its
treatment of African Americans, it was a sufficient response to say, “That’s none of
your business.” After adoption of the Charter, though, that response was no longer
adequate. The decision by States to create modern international human rights law
manifested a belief—rooted in a shared sense of outrage about the horrors of Nazi
408 Id. at 100–01.
409 See generally KLARMAN, supra note 349, at 8–170.
410 THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RTS., REP., supra note 403.
411 See DUDZIAK, supra note 2, at 29–39.
412 See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1758), at 74–76 (Bela Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., 2008).
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concentration camps and other wartime abuses413—that a nation’s treatment of its
own minorities was no longer a purely domestic matter. By codifying human rights
norms in international instruments, States converted “domestic” human rights viola-
tions into a subject of international diplomacy.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, two factors made the United States especially
vulnerable to diplomatic pressure for human rights reform. First, the United States
was one of the few countries in the world that maintained legally sanctioned racial
segregation. Second, U.S. government leaders were committed to a moral vision of
the United States as leader of the free world. The juxtaposition of that moral vision
with the reality of racial segregation made the United States unusually susceptible to
international pressure on human rights.
President Truman was persuaded that civil rights reform at home was necessary
to advance U.S. foreign policy interests. In February 1948, Truman delivered a special
message to Congress proposing enactment of civil rights laws to “establish a perma-
nent civil rights commission, outlaw lynching, and protect the right to vote, among
other proposals.”414 The President stated:
If we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose freedom is
in jeopardy, if we wish to restore hope to those who have already
lost their civil liberties, if we wish to fulfill the promise that is
ours, we must correct the remaining imperfections in our prac-
tice of democracy.415
Thus, Truman told Congress that the United States needed civil rights legislation to pro-
mote its foreign policy interests. However, Southern Democrats who controlled key
committees in Congress blocked civil rights legislation for the duration of Truman’s
presidency.416 Unable to secure legislative support for civil rights reform, the Truman
Administration decided to support the efforts of human rights litigants who were try-
ing to persuade the Supreme Court to align U.S. federal law with then-emerging inter-
national human rights norms.417 That litigation is the subject of the next section.
B. Early Human Rights Litigation: 1948 to 1954
Between 1948 and 1954, the Supreme Court decided eleven cases in which a party
challenged racial or ethnic discrimination and one or more briefs cited the UDHR or
the Charter’s human rights provisions.418 After 1954—thanks to the narrow defeat of
413 See G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) (“disregard and contempt for
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind”).
414 See DUDZIAK, supra note 2, at 82.
415 Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights, 20 PUB. PAPERS 121 (Feb. 2, 1948).
416 See SLOSS, supra note 36, at 193.
417 Id.
418 Those cases are summarized in the next paragraph. Additionally, the Supreme Court
decided at least seven other cases between 1948 and 1954 that did not involve racial or ethnic
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the Bricker Amendment in the Senate and the Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Board of Education—activists who had been pressing human rights arguments made
a tactical decision to stop invoking international human rights instruments in domestic
litigation, and to rely instead on the Fourteenth Amendment.419 This section focuses
on the period when citations to international human rights instruments appeared regu-
larly in Supreme Court briefs.
The antidiscrimination cases addressed in this section include four cases challeng-
ing school segregation,420 two cases challenging California laws that discriminated
against Japanese nationals,421 one case involving discrimination in interstate transpor-
tation,422 one case involving a state civil rights statute,423 and three cases challenging
racially restrictive covenants.424 (A racially restrictive covenant is a contract between
private parties to prohibit sale or rental of property to non-whites.) In nine of the
eleven cases, the party challenging discrimination cited the UDHR and/or the Charter
in its main brief.425 In the other two cases, the reference to international human rights
discrimination, but where one or more briefs cited the UDHR and/or the UN Charter’s human
rights provisions. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); United States ex
rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347 (1952); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160
(1948). This section focuses on antidiscrimination cases.
419 See SLOSS, supra note 36, at 178, 231.
420 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in D.C. public
schools is unconstitutional); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)
(holding that racial segregation in a University of Oklahoma graduate program violated the
Equal Protection Clause); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that racial segre-
gation in the University of Texas Law School violated the Equal Protection Clause); Sipuel v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (holding that University of Oklahoma
violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying applicant admission because of his race).
421 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (holding that part of California’s Alien Land
Law violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948) (holding that California violated Fourteenth Amendment by denying fishing license
to Japanese national).
422 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (holding that private railroad com-
pany violated the Interstate Commerce Act by maintaining racially segregated dining cars).
423 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (affirming conviction under
Michigan Civil Rights Act for private company that engaged in racial discrimination).
424 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (holding that state court damages award for
breach of racially restrictive covenant would violate Fourteenth Amendment); Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24 (1948) (applying Shelley to restrictive covenant in District of Columbia); Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that state court award of injunctive relief to enforce
racially restrictive covenant violated Fourteenth Amendment).
425 Brief for Petitioners at 6, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 8), 1952 WL
47257; Brief for Respondent at 7, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (No. 517), 1953
WL 78408; Brief for Elmer W. Henderson at 74–75, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S.
816 (1950) (No. 25), 1949 WL 50667; Brief for Appellant at 33, McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (No. 34), 1950 WL 78675; Brief for Petitioner at 66,
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law appeared only in an amicus brief.426 The party challenging racial or ethnic dis-
crimination won all eleven cases. The fact that “human rights claimants”427 won all
eleven antidiscrimination cases suggests that the Justices were receptive to the moral
force of human rights arguments.
The antidiscrimination cases summarized in the previous paragraph contributed
to the federalization of human rights law. Shelley v. Kraemer428 and the other restric-
tive covenant cases expanded the role of federal courts in enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment by expanding the concept of state action. Oyama v. California429 and
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n430 heralded the end of decades of legislation in
California and other states that discriminated against Chinese and Japanese nationals.
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,431 Sweatt v. Painter,432 and McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents,433 laid the groundwork for Brown by chipping away at the
fiction that racially segregated educational facilities could ever truly be equal.434 Fi-
nally, Brown and Bolling v. Sharpe435 set the Supreme Court firmly on a path that led
to the demise of the American system of apartheid.436 In all the cases except Bob-Lo
Excursion Co. v. Michigan,437 the Court invalidated discriminatory practices that had
deep roots in American law, politics and culture, and that were widely accepted as
lawful before the modern human rights revolution. The Court’s consistent record of
invalidating racially discriminatory laws and practices between 1948 and 1954 her-
alded a moral and political revolution in the United States. That revolution aligned
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44), 1950 WL 78681; Brief for Petitioner at 33–34,
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (No. 533), 1948 WL 47429; Con-
solidated Brief for Petitioners at 108, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (Nos. 290, 291),
1947 WL 44429; Brief for Petitioners in McGhee v. Sipes at 9, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948) (No. 87), 1947 WL 30427; Supplemental Brief of Petitioners in Support of Review
by Certiorari at 7, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 72), 1947 WL 44156; Brief for
Petitioners at 10, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (No. 44), 1947 WL 44264.
426 See Motion and Brief for the NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae at 13, Bob-Lo Excursion
Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (No. 374), 1947 WL 44321; Motion of the National
Lawyers Guild for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae at 6, Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (No. 369), 1948 WL 47425.
427 The term “human rights claimants” refers to parties who cited international human
rights instruments, as well as parties whose supporting amici cited international human rights
instruments.
428 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
429 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
430 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
431 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
432 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
433 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
434 See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 637; Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 629; Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 631.
435 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
436 See DUDZIAK, supra note 2, at 102.
437 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
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closely with the political morality of human rights, which was just beginning a process
of global diffusion in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
The Supreme Court did not rely on international law, as such, to decide the cases
under review. Oyama is the only case that includes a significant discussion of the
Charter’s human rights provisions.438 Even in Oyama, discussion of the Charter ap-
pears only in concurring opinions.439 Although the Court rarely addressed international
law arguments explicitly, several factors suggest that the political morality of human
rights influenced the Court’s decisions.
The Truman Administration filed briefs supporting human rights claimants in
seven of the cases under review. The Administration filed a single brief in Shelley v.
Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge.440 It filed briefs in both Takahashi and Henderson.441 (In
Henderson, the government filed a brief supporting Henderson, although he was tech-
nically an opposing party.442) It filed a single brief in Sweatt v. Painter and McClaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents.443 Finally, after Eisenhower was elected President, the
lame duck Truman Administration filed a single amicus brief in Bolling v. Sharpe
and Brown v. Board of Education.444 The government briefs generally highlighted
the foreign policy implications of racial/ethnic discrimination and urged the Court to
consider the contested issues in the context of global human rights norms.445
For example, the narrow question in Shelley was whether a state court injunction
to enforce a racially restrictive covenant constituted “state action” under the Four-
teenth Amendment.446 The government’s brief noted that the United States has a treaty
obligation under the UN Charter to promote “universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms, for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion.”447 The brief also cited a General Assembly resolution
calling on governments “to put an immediate end to religious and so-called racial
438 See Oyama, 332 U.S. at 649–50.
439 Four Justices joined two separate concurring opinions that relied partly on the Charter.
See Oyama, 332 U.S. at 649–50 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring).
440 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(Nos. 72, 87, 290, 291), 1947 WL 44159 [hereinafter Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer].
441 See Brief for the United States, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (No.
25), 1949 WL 50329; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (No. 533), 1948 WL 47431.
442 See SLOSS, supra note 36, at 226.
443 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curae, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (No. 34).
444 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), 1952 WL 82045 [hereinafter Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ.].
445 For detailed support of this claim, see SLOSS, supra note 36, at 193–94, 226–29, 245–46.
446 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
447 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 440, at 97.
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persecutions and discrimination . . . .”448 The government concluded this portion of
its brief as follows:
The legislative, executive, and international pronouncements set
out above reflect a public policy wholly inconsistent with the en-
forcement of racial restrictive covenants. . . . [E]ven if the decrees
below are not stricken on specific constitutional grounds, they
may properly be set aside as being inconsistent with the public
policy of the United States.449
Thus, the government cited the Charter and other international instruments to support
its argument that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants would contra-
vene national public policy.
Thurgood Marshall represented either a party, an amicus, or a related party in
ten of the antidiscrimination cases referenced above.450 Marshall personally filed
briefs presenting arguments based on the UN Charter in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents,451 Sweatt v. Painter,452 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n,453 Bob-Lo Ex-
cursion Co. v. Michigan,454 and McGhee v. Sipes.455 Marshall’s brief in Sweatt argued
that “we have fought two World Wars for the preservation and maintenance of de-
mocracy, and have become a signatory of the United Nations Charter which provides
that there shall be no discrimination based on race, creed or color.”456 His brief in
McGhee v. Sipes (the companion case to Shelley) said: “The human rights provisions
of the United Nations Charter, as treaty provisions, are the supreme law of the land
and no citizen may lawfully enter into a contract in subversion of their purposes. The
448 Id. at 98.
449 Id. at 101–02.
450 Marshall represented the petitioners in Sipuel, 332 U.S. 631, and Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629.
He represented the appellant in McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637, and the respondent in Barrows, 346
U.S. 249. He filed amicus briefs on behalf of the NAACP in Bob-Lo, 333 U.S. 28,
Henderson, 339 U.S. 816, and Takahashi, 334 U.S. 410. He was counsel for petitioner in
McGhee v. Sipes, 333 U.S. 28 (1948); McGhee was joined with Shelley, 334 U.S. 1, and
closely related to Hurd, 334 U.S. 24. Finally, he served as counsel for several parties in Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which was litigated in tandem with Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), was the only case
in which he did not participate.
451 Brief for Appellant at 33, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (No. 34), 1950 WL 78675 (quoting
Justice Black’s concurring opinion in Oyama, 332 U.S. 633).
452 Brief for Petitioner, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44), 1950 WL 78681.
453 Motion and Brief for the NAACP as Amicus Curiae, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (No. 533),
1948 WL 47434.
454 Motion and Brief for the NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (No. 374),
1947 WL 44321.
455 Brief for Petitioners, 331 U.S. 804 (1947) (No. 87), 1947 WL 44154.
456 Brief for Petitioner at 66, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44), 1950 WL 78681.
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restrictive agreement here presented for enforcement falls within this proscription.”457
Marshall’s involvement in these cases is significant because he personally—more
than almost any other lawyer in the United States—became a symbol for the moral
force of the civil rights movement. His repeated reliance on the Charter’s human rights
provisions suggests that the political morality of human rights influenced his thinking
about antidiscrimination law. Moreover, Thurgood Marshall, in his capacity as a liti-
gator and a Supreme Court Justice, exerted as much influence on the development
of antidiscrimination law in the United States as any other single individual in the
decades after World War II.
Bolling v. Sharpe is the single most important decision among the cases under
review.458 Bolling involved a challenge to racial segregation in Washington D.C. pub-
lic schools; it was litigated and decided together with Brown v. Board of Education.
The Truman Administration filed a single amicus brief in Brown and Bolling.459 The
brief highlighted the special problems posed by racial discrimination in the District
of Columbia.
This city is the window through which the world looks into our
house. . . . Foreign officials and visitors naturally judge this coun-
try and our people by their experiences and observations in the
nation’s capital . . . . The shamefulness and absurdity of Washing-
ton’s treatment of Negro Americans is highlighted by the presence
of many dark-skinned foreign visitors. Capital custom not only
humiliates colored citizens, but is a source of considerable embar-
rassment to these visitors. Foreign officials are often mistaken for
American Negroes and refused food, lodging and entertainment.460
Although the brief emphasized the unique problems caused by racial discrimination
in the nation’s capital, it also placed those concerns in a broader, global context.
It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom
and tyranny that the problem of racial discrimination must be
viewed. The United States is trying to prove to the people of the
world, of every nationality, race, and color, that a free democracy
is the most civilized and most secure form of government yet de-
vised by man. We must set an example for others by showing firm
determination to remove existing flaws in our democracy. The
existence of discrimination against minority groups in the United
457 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 455, at 9.
458 See 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
459 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., supra note 444.
460 Id. at 4–5.
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States has an adverse effect upon our relations with other coun-
tries. . . . [T]he continuance of racial discrimination in the United
States remains a source of constant embarrassment to this Govern-
ment in the day-to-day conduct of its foreign relations; and it jeop-
ardizes the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the
free and democratic nations of the world.461
In sum, the government’s argument in Brown and Bolling was emphatically moral and
global, rather than legal and domestic. Moreover, as other commentators have noted,
the government’s brief had an important influence on the votes of undecided Justices.462
From a legal standpoint, petitioners’ argument that racial segregation in public
schools violated the Constitution was exceptionally weak.463 Justice Jackson “ridiculed
the NAACP’s brief as sociology, not law.”464 Referring jointly to Brown and Bolling,
Jackson assessed the legal arguments as follows:
I find nothing in the text that says this [racial segregation in
schools] is unconstitutional. Nothing in the opinions of the courts
says that it is unconstitutional. Nothing in the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment says that it is unconstitutional. . . . On the basis
of precedents, I would have to say that it is constitutional.465
When the Justices first met in private conference to discuss Brown and Bolling, only
four Justices expressed clear support for a holding that racial segregation in public
schools is unconstitutional.466 The other five Justices were either undecided or were
prepared to affirm the constitutionality of racial segregation.467 Even so, about eighteen
months after that initial conference, the Court ruled unanimously that racial segrega-
tion in public schools is unconstitutional.468
How can we explain the unanimous decisions in Brown and Bolling, despite the
dearth of legal authority to support those decisions? To support the foreign policy goals
articulated by the Truman Administration, the Court had to hold that racial segregation
461 Id. at 6–8.
462 See KLARMAN, supra note 349, at 299; John Q. Barrett, Supreme Court Law Clerks’
Recollections of Brown v. Board of Education, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 515, 547 (2004).
463 See SLOSS, supra note 36, at 241–45. We are not suggesting that Brown was wrongly
decided. Our point is simply that the Court’s decision in Brown relied heavily on moral
reasoning, rather than strictly legal reasoning. Moreover, the key moral idea that influenced
the Court’s reasoning in Brown—the idea that racial discrimination is morally wrong—is one
of the central tenets of the political morality of human rights. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
464 SLOSS, supra note 36, at 243.
465 DEL DICKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, 1940–1985: THE PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 652 (2001).
466 See SLOSS, supra note 36, at 243.
467 Id.
468 See Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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was illegal. It could have reached that result without overruling Plessy v. Ferguson469
by holding that racial segregation in public schools violates the UN Charter, and that
the Charter supersedes state laws under the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, the petitioner’s
brief in Bolling defended the Charter argument at great length.470 From a strictly legal
perspective, the Charter argument was arguably stronger than the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment arguments.471 However, the Charter argument presented a dilemma for the
Justices. If the Court applied the Charter to invalidate racial segregation, rather than
applying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it would have been tacitly admitting
that the Charter provides stronger protection against racial discrimination than does
the Equal Protection Clause. The Justices were not prepared, either psychologically
or politically, to make such an admission.472 As a prominent Stanford law professor
commented in a related case: “It would seem, indeed, a reproach to our constitutional
system to confess that the values it establishes fall below any requirement of the Char-
ter. One should think very seriously before admitting such a deficiency.”473 To avoid
admitting such a deficiency, the Justices adopted a moral reading of the Constitution,474
rather than a strictly legal interpretation. Their moral reading of the Constitution was
starkly at odds with the “separate but equal” doctrine that had prevailed for more than
half a century. However, their moral reading aligned perfectly with the morality of
human rights that was slowly spreading around the world at that time. In sum, the
Court incorporated the political morality of human rights into its interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause through a process of silent incorporation.
Brown and Bolling were landmark constitutional decisions. Not only did the
Court’s decisions fundamentally transform equal protection doctrine, they also made
a substantial contribution to the ongoing federalization of human rights in the United
States. Therefore, insofar as the political morality of human rights influenced the
Court’s decisions, that political morality also exerted indirect influence over subse-
quent constitutional changes because the Court’s decisions in Brown and Bolling
converted the prohibition on racial discrimination from an attractive moral ideal into
a core principle of U.S. constitutional law.
C. The Incorporation Debate
Justice Hugo Black sparked the “incorporation debate” with his dissenting opin-
ion in Adamson v. California,475 one year before the United Nations adopted the
469 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
470 See Brief for Petitioners at 54–55, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 8),
1952 WL 47257.
471 See SLOSS, supra note 36, at 243.
472 See id. at 246–48.
473 Charles Fairman, Editorial Comment, Finis to Fujii, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 682, 689 (1952).
474 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996).
475 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
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UDHR.476 Black acknowledged that the Bill of Rights, as originally understood,
merely operated as a constraint on the federal government and did not bind state gov-
ernments.477 However, he claimed, a central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to make the Bill of Rights binding on the states.478 Black’s position came to be known
as “total incorporation” because he contended that the Fourteenth Amendment made
the entire Bill of Rights binding on the states.479
Justice Black never persuaded a majority of the Supreme Court to endorse his total
incorporation theory. Instead, in a series of decisions between 1948 and 1971, the
Court developed the doctrine of “selective incorporation.”480 Under selective incor-
poration doctrine, rights included in the Bill of Rights that qualify as “fundamental
rights” are incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and are
binding on state governments.481 However, some rights included in the Bill of Rights
are not “fundamental rights” and are therefore not binding on state governments. The
Court never cited the UDHR or other international human rights instruments to justify
its decisions about which rights are “fundamental.” Nevertheless, the pattern of judi-
cial decisions in selective incorporation cases is broadly consistent with the political
morality of human rights. The Court generally held, with a couple of notable excep-
tions, that provisions in the Bill of Rights that lack analogues in the UDHR are not
fundamental, whereas provisions in the Bill of Rights that do have analogues in the
UDHR are fundamental.482
The Court’s decisions in selective incorporation cases were broadly consistent
with the “human rights theory,” which holds that a specific right codified in the Bill
of Rights qualifies as “fundamental” for selective incorporation doctrine if and only
if the right is included in the UDHR and/or the ICCPR.483 The Supreme Court em-
ployed the rubric of “fundamental rights” in the early twentieth century to determine
which rights bind the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.484 However, the con-
cept of fundamental rights that guided judicial decisions in the early twentieth cen-
tury was starkly at odds with the political morality of human rights. In contrast, the
concept of fundamental rights that the Court applied in incorporation decisions be-
tween 1948 and 1976 was generally consistent with the morality of human rights. The
Court continued to use the term “fundamental rights,” but the meaning of the term
476 The analysis in this section borrows liberally from Sloss, supra note 78.
477 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 79.
478 See id. at 71–72 (Black, J., dissenting).
479 See Sloss, supra note 78, at 79–82.
480 Id. at 79, 83.
481 See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
482 See Sloss, supra note 78, at 78.
483 See id. at 80.
484 See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91–98 (1908).
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changed.485 In essence, the Court shifted from a narrow conception of fundamental
rights that emphasized state sovereignty to a broader, universalist conception that em-
phasized federal supremacy.
Four examples illustrate the distinction between competing concepts of funda-
mental rights. In 1904, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to confront
adverse witnesses is not fundamental and therefore not binding on the states.486 The
Court reversed that decision in 1965 in Pointer v. Texas.487 The Court held in 1937
that subjecting a criminal defendant to double jeopardy did not violate “fundamental
principles of liberty and justice.”488 Thirty years later, the Court decided “that the
double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment” binds the states because it “rep-
resents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage.”489 In 1942, the Court held
in Betts v. Brady490 that the right of an indigent criminal defendant to have counsel
appointed for him was not a fundamental right.491 The Court reversed that decision
twenty years later, holding that indigent criminal defendants have a fundamental right
to appointed counsel.492 Finally, the Court held in 1947 in Adamson v. California that
the Fifth Amendment protection from self-incrimination did not bind the states.493 The
Court overruled Adamson less than two decades later, holding in Malloy v. Hogan
“that the Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is . . . pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.”494All four of
the pre-1948 decisions were inconsistent with the morality of human rights because
they denied “fundamental” status to rights protected under international human rights
law.495 In contrast, all of the post-1948 decisions were consistent with the morality
of human rights because they granted “fundamental” status to those same rights.
To understand selective incorporation doctrine, one must consider both cases and
clauses. As of 1976, five provisions in the Bill of Rights (the five “unincorporated
clauses”) were not binding on the states: the Second Amendment right to bear arms;496
the Third Amendment prohibition on quartering of soldiers;497 the Fifth Amendment
485 Accord PRIMUS, supra note 3.
486 West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
487 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
488 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
489 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
490 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
491 Id.
492 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
493 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
494 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
495 References to the relevant provisions of human rights law are included in Section III.C
and Table 5. Although the Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
treats the right to appointed counsel as a Sixth Amendment right, we classify that right
(“state pays for counsel”) as an unenumerated right because it is not listed explicitly in the
Sixth Amendment.
496 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
497 Id. amend. III.
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grand jury clause;498 the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases;499 and
the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause.500 Under Black’s total incorporation
theory, all five provisions should be binding on the states. Therefore, the Court’s re-
fusal to incorporate those five provisions is inconsistent with the total incorporation
theory. In contrast, the Court’s refusal to incorporate the five unincorporated clauses
suggests that the Court’s operative conception of fundamental rights was consistent
with the political morality of human rights because all five unincorporated clauses
protect rights that are not included in either the UDHR or the ICCPR.501
Between 1948 and 1976, the Court decided thirteen “express incorporation cases”
and two “implied incorporation cases.”502 Those decisions, in total, made fifteen dis-
tinct rights in the Bill of Rights binding on the states. The two implied incorporation
cases assumed that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury503 and the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of excessive bail504 bind the states. The Court held explicitly
that the following Bill of Rights provisions bind the states under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: the First Amendment right to petition the government;505 the Fourth Amendment
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures;506 the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement;507 the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule;508 the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination clause;509 the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause;510 and the
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishments clause.511 Additionally, the Court
held expressly that six distinct provisions in the Sixth Amendment bind the states:
the right to a public trial,512 the right to a speedy trial,513 the right to confront adverse
498 Id. amend. V.
499 Id. amend. VII.
500 Id. amend. VIII.
501 The Supreme Court decided in the nineteenth century that the Second Amendment, the
Fifth Amendment grand jury clause, and the Seventh Amendment do not bind the states. See
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 253, 261 (1886) (Second Amendment); Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (grand jury clause); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1875)
(Seventh Amendment). The Court has never ruled explicitly on the Third Amendment or the
excessive fines clause. It did not issue specific decisions regarding incorporation of any of
these clauses between 1948 and 1976. Regardless, given the intense controversy over incor-
poration during that period, the absence of any decision incorporating the clauses signals an
implicit view that the rights at issue are not “fundamental rights.”
502 See infra notes 503–17 and accompanying text.
503 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1961).
504 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
505 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963).
506 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949).
507 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964).
508 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961).
509 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
510 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795–96 (1969).
511 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962).
512 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–73 (1948).
513 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225–26 (1967).
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witnesses,514 the right to compulsory process,515 the right to appointed counsel;516 and
the right to a jury trial in criminal cases.517
The cases cited in the previous paragraph provide additional evidence that the
Court’s operative conception of fundamental rights was broadly consistent with the
political morality of human rights because twelve of the fifteen rights that the Court
held to be “fundamental” are included in the UDHR and/or the ICCPR. The Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement and the prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures correspond to Articles 9 and 12 of the UDHR and Articles 9(1) and 17(1)
of the ICCPR. The Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause corresponds to Arti-
cle 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR; the double jeopardy clause corresponds to Article 14(7)
of the ICCPR. The Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and a public trial
are included in Article 10 of the UDHR and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR. The Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial is protected by Articles 9(3) and 14(3)(c) of the
ICCPR. The Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and to confront adverse
witnesses are protected by Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR.518 The Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel is protected by Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR. The Eighth
Amendment prohibition on excessive bail corresponds to Article 9(3) of the ICCPR;519
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments corresponds to Article 5 of the
UDHR and Article 7 of the ICCPR.
The Supreme Court decided three incorporation cases in the 1960s that are in-
consistent with the human rights theory. Edwards v. South Carolina520 incorporated
the First Amendment right to petition the government.521 Mapp v. Ohio522 incorpo-
rated the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.523 Duncan v. Louisiana incorporated
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.524 All three cases are inconsistent with the
human rights theory because, in each case, the Court made rights binding on the states
that are not protected under either the UDHR or the ICCPR.525 Nevertheless, if one
514 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
515 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1967).
516 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345–46 (1963).
517 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968).
518 The right to compulsory process is not included in our list of sixty-eight rights because
it is not included in the CCP database.
519 The prohibition on excessive bail is not included in our list of sixty-eight rights because
it does not appear in the UDHR.
520 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
521 Id.
522 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
523 Id.
524 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968).
525 The First Amendment right to petition the government is similar to the right of peaceful
assembly in Article 21 of the ICCPR. However, we treat the rights of petition and assembly
as distinct rights because they appear separately in the First Amendment and they are listed as
separate rights in the CCP codebook.
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views the Court’s incorporation decisions as a whole—including the five unincorpo-
rated clauses,526 the two implied incorporation cases, and the thirteen express incor-
poration cases—the human rights theory fits more closely with the actual pattern of
Supreme Court decisions than Justice Black’s total incorporation theory. Black’s theory
is consistent with only fifteen of the twenty decisions because his theory is inconsistent
with all five unincorporated clauses. In contrast, the human rights theory is consistent
with seventeen of the twenty decisions, including all five unincorporated clauses, both
implied incorporation cases, and ten of thirteen express incorporation cases.
In addition to being consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the human rights
theory also provides an explanation for the selective incorporation doctrine. To ap-
preciate this point, recall that the incorporation doctrine constituted a radical depar-
ture from traditional principles of constitutional federalism. Justice Harlan made this
point eloquently in several dissenting opinions. For example, in Malloy v. Hogan, he
criticized the majority for creating a rule of “compelled uniformity, which is incon-
sistent with the purpose of our federal system and which is achieved . . . by encroach-
ment on the States’ sovereign powers. . . .”527 Similarly, in Mapp v. Ohio, Justice
Harlan criticized the majority for upsetting the “proper balance between state and
federal responsibility in the administration of criminal justice . . . .”528 He argued
that “this Court should continue to forbear from fettering the States with an adamant
rule which may embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar problems in crim-
inal law enforcement.”529
The Court never developed a fully satisfactory response to Justice Harlan’s con-
cerns about encroachment on state sovereignty. However, one strand of the Court’s
response emphasized the human rights principles of universality and inalienability
(without citing international sources to support those principles). For example, the
issue in Malloy v. Hogan was whether the Fifth Amendment “privilege against self-
incrimination is . . . safeguarded against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.”530
The Court had previously held in both Adamson and Twining v. New Jersey531 that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the self-incrimination clause.532 Malloy
overruled both Adamson and Twining.533 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
distinguished between two approaches to the privilege against self-incrimination.534
One approach, which he associated with Twining, views the privilege as “a mere rule
526 As noted above, the Court did not issue express decisions about the five unincorporated
clauses between 1948 and 1976. Nevertheless, we count each unincorporated clause as a
“decision” not to incorporate that particular clause.
527 378 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 27–33.
528 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
529 Id. at 681.
530 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2 (1964).
531 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
532 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53–54 (1947); Twining, 211 U.S. at 107.
533 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6, 17.
534 Id. at 9.
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of evidence . . . proved by experience to be expedient.”535 The competing approach,
which he endorsed, views the privilege as “an unchangeable principle of universal
justice.”536 Under the Twining view, which was rooted in traditional principles of
constitutional federalism, it makes sense to allow individual states to apply the rule
against self-incrimination in different ways. Under Justice Brennan’s view, though,
the Court will not tolerate a diversity of approaches in different states because fed-
eral courts must not allow the states to offend “an unchangeable principle of universal
justice.”537 In short, Justice Brennan invoked the political morality of human rights
to justify application of a uniform standard in state and federal courts.538
Reasonable people may disagree with Justice Brennan’s moral intuitions about
universal justice. Regardless, the Court’s selective incorporation decisions suggest that
a majority of Justices in the 1960s shared Justice Brennan’s moral intuitions. Not coin-
cidentally, those moral intuitions aligned closely with the political morality of human
rights, which was gradually gaining acceptance throughout the world at that time. The
fact that several Justices shared a commitment to the global morality of human rights
helps explain why the Court was prepared to override traditional principles of state
sovereignty and impose a new rule of “compelled uniformity.”539
D. Response to Objections
We have argued that the diffusion of human rights as a global political morality
was a significant causal factor that contributed to the federalization of human rights
in the United States between 1948 and 1976. Since this claim is quite novel, we con-
sider four potential objections.
First, one could argue that the federalization of human rights resulted from the
natural evolution of the internal logic of American constitutionalism. In support of
this view, one could cite language from the Declaration of Independence to show that
the Declaration itself contained the seeds of the political morality of human rights.
One could also argue that the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically intended to
transfer control over the protection of individual rights from the states to the federal
government.540
These arguments are not without merit. Nevertheless, a purely domestic, evolu-
tionary explanation for the federalization of human rights is unpersuasive. Consider,
first, the proposition that constitutional change in the United States was driven entirely
by domestic factors, without any influence from transnational factors. That proposition
535 Id.
536 Id.
537 Id.
538 See id. at 11 (“[T]he same standards must determine whether an accused’s silence in
either a federal or state proceeding is justified.”).
539 Id. at 16 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
540 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 18.
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is difficult to reconcile with the large body of evidence—summarized in Part II and
in other scholarship referenced in Part II—demonstrating that the diffusion of human
rights as a global political morality had a significant influence on constitutional change
in most other countries on this planet. Those who favor a purely domestic account of
constitutional change must defend the claim that the United States was immune from
global forces that affected most other countries in the world. That claim, on its face,
seems quite implausible.
Moreover, the domestic, evolutionary explanation fails to account for the fact that
the federalization of human rights was not merely a minor evolutionary develop-
ment; it was a revolutionary change in American constitutional law. The American
Bar Association (“ABA”) argued vehemently in the years after World War II that
federalization of human rights posed a substantial threat to American federalism.541
Moreover, the ABA was not alone. In the early 1950s, a majority of Senators sup-
ported a constitutional amendment (the Bricker Amendment) designed to protect the
United States from the perceived threat that international human rights law posed to
the U.S. federal system.542 The ABA and numerous senators objected to the federal-
ization of human rights because they recognized, quite correctly, that the transfer of
authority over human rights from the states to the national government constituted a
revolutionary change in the federal structure of our constitutional system.543 Even after
the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, Southern states continued to
resist the national government’s efforts to impose school desegregation on white
citizens who believed that segregation was morally justified.544 The Southerners who
resisted desegregation could cite decades of constitutional practice and precedent
supporting their view that federally mandated desegregation violated constitutional
protections for states’ rights.
One additional factor also casts doubt on the domestic, evolutionary account of
federalization. The prohibition on racial discrimination is one of the core principles
of international human rights law. The antidiscrimination principle is the only substan-
tive human rights principle included in the U.N. Charter.545 The antidiscrimination
principle also features prominently in the Universal Declaration. However, that prin-
ciple was not included in either the original Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Granted,
the antidiscrimination principle became a formal part of the U.S. Constitution with
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.546 However, Supreme Court decisions in
541 See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE
SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990).
542 See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF
EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
543 Id.
544 See, e.g., ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES
USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS (2009).
545 See U.N. Charter, art. 55 (promising respect for human rights “without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion”).
546 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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cases such as The Civil Rights Cases547 and Plessy v. Ferguson548 largely eviscerated
the Fourteenth Amendment. The uncomfortable fact, which Americans are reluctant
to acknowledge, is that white supremacy was the dominant political morality in the
South from the end of Reconstruction until the 1950s or 1960s, and the national com-
mitment to constitutional protection for states’ rights shielded Jim Crow from federal
interference. Of course, many individual citizens expressed strong moral opposition
to racial discrimination long before the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.549
However, their moral opposition had very little practical impact on federal constitu-
tional law until after the moral condemnation of racial discrimination was codified
in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration. In short, the political morality of
human rights, with its emphasis on the antidiscrimination principle, was largely absent
from American constitutional law before 1948.550 Thus, the constitutional commitment
to racial equality manifested in Brown and its progeny was not merely a minor evo-
lutionary change in the development of U.S. constitutional law; it was a dramatic,
revolutionary change in fundamental constitutional principles.
A second potential objection to our account can be summarized as follows. In the
decades after World War II, the United States exerted substantial influence over the
development of new international human rights norms.551 Hence, Professor Henkin
has described international human rights law as an American “export.”552 After we ex-
ported human rights norms to other countries, a “boomerang pattern” exerted pressure
on the United States to align domestic law with international human rights norms.553
Therefore, assuming that international norms had a causal influence on the federal-
ization of human rights law in the United States, that causal explanation reduces to a
claim that American values influenced the federalization of human rights law both di-
rectly (through legislation and judicial decisions) and indirectly, through the medium
of international norms and institutions.
We agree that human rights norms had a boomerang effect on U.S. constitutional
law. However, with due respect for Professor Henkin, the description of international
human rights law as an American “export” is misleading. During negotiations leading
to adoption of the U.N. Charter, the United States strongly resisted inclusion of human
547 See generally 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
548 See generally 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
549 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
550 One could cite United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), and Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), as counter-examples. Granted, the Court did endorse the anti-
discrimination principle in both cases. Nevertheless, in the history of the United States from
Reconstruction until Brown, Yick Wo and Wong Kim Ark are small islands of human rights
morality in a vast sea of racial discrimination.
551 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
552 Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 421 (1979).
553 KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 395, at 12–13.
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rights language in the Charter.554 Edward Stettinius, speaking on behalf of the U.S.
government, told other delegates: “[U]nder no circumstances would America support
an explicit reference to racial equality.”555 Ultimately, the United States reluctantly
accepted Charter text on racial equality, but only after John Foster Dulles persuaded
other nations to accept language that barred the United Nations from intervening “in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”556 Dulles’s
domestic jurisdiction clause shielded countries from coercive action by the United
Nations, but that clause could not protect Jim Crow from the onslaught of the global
morality of human rights.
Scholars agree that Eleanor Roosevelt—acting as the U.S. representative and the
chairperson of the Human Rights Commission—played a critical role in drafting the
Universal Declaration.557 However, Charles Malik (from Lebanon), Peng-chun Chang
(from China) and René Cassin (from France) were also highly influential in shaping
the final text of the Universal Declaration.558 Moreover, like every internationally
agreed instrument, the text of the UDHR was the product of negotiation and compro-
mise. The diverse countries that participated in drafting the UDHR drew on their
own constitutions as sources of rights that could go into the Declaration. As Elkins,
Ginsburg, and Simmons note, “U.N. negotiators drew from not only salient historical
documents such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, but also from the con-
stitutions of the home countries of the negotiators.”559 Thus, the range of influences
that shaped the UDHR was broad, not simply mimicking the “constitutions of the most
powerful states.”560 In fact, the “UDHR only weakly resembled the U.S. Constitution’s
Bill of Rights,” despite “the hegemonic position of the United States.”561 The analysis
of Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons finds that the U.S. Constitution as of 1948 “ranks
in the bottom fifth in terms of similarity to the UDHR.”562 The constitutions most sim-
ilar to the UDHR in rights content include Haiti’s constitution of 1946 and Iceland’s
of 1944.563 Our analysis of national constitutions, employing a different approach than
that of Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons, finds that as of 1947—on the eve of adop-
tion of the UDHR—fifteen countries had national constitutions with more UDHR
rights than the U.S. Constitution (which was tied with the Constitution of Honduras).
Morsink identifies affinities between the UDHR and the contemporary constitutions
of Uruguay, Syria, Turkey, Iceland, Denmark, Lebanon, Belgium, Cuba, Portugal,
554 ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 37.
555 Id.
556 See id. at 46–50. The quoted language is from the U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 7.
557 See generally GLENDON, supra note 551.
558 See id.
559 See Elkins et al., supra note 48, at 74.
560 Id.
561 Id.
562 Id. at 75.
563 Id.
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Spain, and Switzerland.564 More broadly, as prior research has shown, a number of
small countries exercised significant influence at the UDHR negotiations.565
Consequently, the moral principles embodied in the Universal Declaration are not
uniquely American principles. They are universal moral principles with roots in many
cultures and many nations. Moreover, insofar as the Universal Declaration prioritized
the antidiscrimination principle as a core principle of the political morality of human
rights, there was an obvious tension between the moral framework of the UDHR and
the dominant political morality that prevailed in the United States from the end of
Reconstruction until World War II. Therefore, the human rights morality that had a
“boomerang effect” on the United States was actually quite different from the political
morality that shaped American constitutional law in the decades before World War II.
The third objection to our claim about the causal influence of the morality of
human rights relies on Professor Dudziak’s work. She argues—quite convincingly, in
our view—that the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union was a critical factor that contributed to the civil rights revolution in the United
States.566 Her account, like our account, emphasizes transnational factors that influ-
enced domestic constitutional change in the United States.567 Even so, one could argue
that our emphasis on the political morality of human rights is misplaced because the
transnational factors that really mattered involved Cold War realpolitik, not the fuzzy
morality of human rights.
It is impossible to quantify the relative importance of different factors that exerted
causal influence over constitutional change in the United States in the period from
1948 to 1976. We claim only that the diffusion of human rights as a global political
morality was one such factor, and that the influence of human rights morality was not
insignificant. Indeed, from our perspective, the Cold War realpolitik story and the
human rights morality story are inextricably intertwined. The Cold War created a com-
pelling strategic imperative for the United States to persuade Asian, African, and Latin
American countries that American democracy was a better political system than Soviet
communism. To win the battle of ideas between democracy and communism, the
United States had to make moral arguments that appealed to the Asian, African and
Latin American audiences whom we wanted to persuade. For those audiences, the
prohibition on racial discrimination—codified in the U.N. Charter and the UDHR—
was an extremely important moral principle, and the failure of the U.S. constitutional
system to conform to that moral principle was the most glaring defect of American
564 JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 46, 257, 261 (1999).
565 See id. at xiv. See generally Susan Waltz, Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 23 THIRD WORLD Q. 437 (2002); Susan Waltz,
Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 44 (2001).
566 See generally DUDZIAK, supra note 2.
567 Id. at 14–17.
2019] UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 1259
democracy. Therefore, the moral (human rights) argument for ending racial segrega-
tion and the strategic (Cold War) argument for ending segregation were mutually
reinforcing. The United States had to incorporate the morality of human rights into
constitutional doctrine to be able to make a convincing case that American democracy
was better than Soviet communism.
The final objection emphasizes the fact that the key judicial decisions and legisla-
tive enactments that federalized human rights law in the United States rarely men-
tioned international human rights instruments. Moreover, citations to the U.N. Charter
and the Universal Declaration largely disappeared from Supreme Court briefs after
1954. The lack of express reliance on international human rights instruments, one
could argue, demonstrates that international human rights law had very little impact
on federalization.
Here, we note the distinction between human rights law and the political moral-
ity of human rights. We agree that international human rights law, as such, is largely
absent from the legal reasoning presented in Supreme Court decisions. However, the
actual texts of the Supreme Court decisions and legislative enactments that trans-
ferred regulatory authority over human rights from the states to the federal govern-
ment provide almost no acknowledgment—much less a legal justification—that the
federal government was appropriating power over human rights and displacing state
regulatory authority in areas previously reserved to the states. Since federal judges
and legislators generally failed to provide an explicit legal rationale to justify the dra-
matic change in constitutional structure associated with the human rights revolution,
it is not surprising that they omitted citations to international human rights instru-
ments. Accordingly, scholars must look beyond the text of judicial decisions and leg-
islative enactments to gain deeper insight into the social, political, and intellectual
forces that produced a fundamental change in the division of power between the states
and the federal government. We hope we have persuaded skeptical readers that the
political morality of human rights was the dominant idea that provided a largely un-
stated intellectual justification for the federalization of human rights in the United
States between 1948 and 1976.
CONCLUSION
In a widely acclaimed book, Professor Samuel Moyn contends that human rights
did not exert significant influence over socio-legal developments until the 1970s.568
This Article demonstrates that Moyn is wrong. Between 1948 and 1976, numerous
countries revised their constitutions to incorporate rights from the Universal Decla-
ration into their national constitutions. During the same period, lawyers, judges, and
legislators in the United States dramatically altered the federal structure of the U.S.
568 SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 3 (2010) (stating that
human rights “emerged in the 1970s seemingly from nowhere”).
1260 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1183
Constitution by transferring power over human rights from the states to the federal
government. Professor Moyn may well be correct to note that the institutional machin-
ery for enforcement of human rights at the international level was not well developed
as of 1976.569 However, his story overlooks the radical changes in domestic constitu-
tions that took place between 1948 and 1976.
Supreme Court decisions in the first decade of this century provoked strong resis-
tance to citation of foreign and international sources in U.S. judicial decisions.570 Our
account of constitutional change in the decades after World War II suggests that the
judges and legislators who want to insulate federal constitutional jurisprudence from
foreign and international influence are acting about fifty years too late. They are trying
to close the barn door long after the foreign horses entered. Indeed, the foreign horses
are so thoroughly intermixed with the domestic horses that it is no longer meaningful
to distinguish between “foreign” and “domestic” influences on federal constitutional
law. Contemporary federal laws protecting fundamental rights are the product of judi-
cial and legislative processes that incorporated global human rights norms into federal
constitutional and statutory law.
Finally, our story has important lessons for U.S. citizens about the nature of
American constitutional identity. Many Americans believe that our national identity
is inextricably linked to the Constitution: our fealty to the Constitution is an important
part of what binds us together as a nation. However, the “constitution” that com-
mands the loyalty of most Americans is not the text adopted in the eighteenth century:
a document that authorized slavery and denied women the right to vote. Rather, the
“constitution” that commands our loyalty is the body of modern constitutional law that
emerged from the human rights revolution in the decades after World War II. Twenty-
first century Americans embrace the modern, human rights constitution because it—
unlike the eighteenth-century Constitution—is consistent with contemporary American
values. However, this Article suggests that the “American values” that shape modern
constitutional law are not distinctively American. To the contrary, they are the univer-
sal values expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which have been
incorporated into national constitutions throughout the world in the past several
decades. Therefore, genuine fealty to the twenty-first century constitution, properly
understood, requires Americans to embrace their identity as global citizens.
569 Id. at 2.
570 In March 2004, the House Subcommittee on the Constitution approved House Reso-
lution 568, which expresses the view “that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of
the laws of the United States should not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements
of foreign institutions.” H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004). See also Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 622–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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APPENDIX
UDHR
article Right
CCP
variable
number
CCP variable
name
In
Constitution?
1 Dignity 58 DIGNITY N
2 Equality of nationality 553 EQUALGR_2 N
2 Equality of gender 553 EQUALGR_1 N
2 Equality of color 553 EQUALGR_10 14th Amend.
2 Equality of creed/beliefs 553 EQUALGR_11 N
2 Equality, property ownership 553 EQUALGR_13 N
2 Equality of parentage 553 EQUALGR_16 N
2 Equality of race 553 EQUALGR_4 14th Amend.
2 Equality of language 553 EQUALGR_5 N
2 Equality of religion 553 EQUALGR_6 N
3 Right to life 604 LIFE 14th Amend.
4 Prohibit slavery, servitude 605 SLAVE 13th Amend.
5 Cruel treatment 607 CRUELTY 8th Amend.
5 Torture 606 TORTURE 8th Amend.
7 Equal protection of law 552 EQUAL 14th Amend.
8 Right to a remedy 524, 349
FALSEIMP,
ILLADMIN N
9 Arbitrary arrest, detention 515 HABCORP 4th Amend.
10 Fair trial 525 FAIRTRI
5th, 6th
Amend.
10 Public trial 527 PUBTRI 6th Amend.
11(1) Right to counsel 534 COUNS 6th Amend.
11(1) State pays for counsel 535 COUNSCOS N
11(1) Double jeopardy 532 DOUBJEP 5th Amend.
11(1) Confront witnesses 522 EXAMWIT 6th Amend.
11(1) Self-incrimination 533 MIRANDA 5th Amend.
11(1) Presumption of innocence 528 PRESINOC N
11(1) Right to appeal 517 RGHTAPP N
11(1) Speedy trial 526 SPEEDTRI 6th Amend.
11(1) Right to interpreter 529 TRILANG N
11(2) No ex post facto law 523 EXPOST Art. I(10)
12 Home, correspondence 513 EVIDENCE 4th Amend.
12 Protect honor/reputation 561 LIBEL N
12 Non-interfere privacy 608 PRIVACY N
13 Free movement 609 FREEMOVE Art. IV(2)
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UDHR
article Right
CCP
variable
number
CCP variable
name
In
Constitution?
14 Right to seek asylum 623 ASYLUM N
15 Deprive nationality 546 CITREV_4 N
16 Right to found family 596 FNDFAM N
16 Right to marry 594 MARRIAGE N
16 Equal rights in marriage 598 MATEQUAL N
17(1) Right to own property 587 PROPRGHT N
17(2) Deprive property 572 EXPLIM_4 5th Amend.
18 Freedom of thought, religion 564 FREEREL 1st Amend.
19 Freedom of expression 611 EXPRESS 1st Amend.
19 Freedom of opinion 610 OPINION N
19 Freedom of press 615 PRESS 1st Amend.
20 Freedom of assembly 618 ASSEM 1st Amend.
20 Freedom of association 619 ASSOC N
21(2) Access to public service 475 CIVIL N
21(3) Universal adult suffrage 430 VOTEUN Various
22 Free develop personality 621 DEVLPERS N
23(1) Just and favorable conditions 591 SAFEWORK N
23(1) Free choice of employment 590 OCCUPATE N
23(3) Just remuneration 574 REMUNER N
23(4) Right to join trade unions 575 JOINTRDE N
24 Holidays with pay 577 LEISURE N
24 Limitation of working hours 577 LEISURE N
25(1) Right to social security 586 FINSUP_1 N
25(1) Financial support unemployed 586 FINSUP_2 N
25(1) Financial support disabled 586 FINSUP_3 N
25(1) Health care 602 HEALTHR N
25(1) Housing 593 SHELTER N
25(1) Standard of living 578 STANDLIV N
25(2) Financial support children 586 FINSUP_4 N
26(1) Equal access higher ed 665 ACHIGHED N
26(1) Compulsory education 660 EDCOMP N
26(1) Free education 662 EDFREE N
27(1) Right to participate in culture 502 CULTRGHT N
27(1) Scientific progress 589 SCIFREE N
27(2) Int’l prop gen’l 582 INTPROP_4 N
